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1 General Introduction 
 
 
 
 
“Don’t you see”, it resounded 
piteously from above. “I’ve got 
no sense of space, that’s it. 
Though I recognize rooms and 
storeys, a certain kind of 
regular arrangement of above 
and below, of right and left, I 
can’t integrate this curious 
arrangement with my senses, I 
can’t experience it intuitively…” 
 
Max Brod (1916) 
 
 
 
Spoken by a spiritual being after detachment from its physical 
body, these words symbolize the fundamental link between the 
experience of the own body and the experience of external space. 
Indeed, the body itself is phenomenally experienced as a spatial 
extension of our selves (James, 1890/1950; Metzinger, 2003), and 
the conception of perceived space without the conception of a 
perceiving self being located somewhere within that space is 
paradoxical. In his essay on the phenomenology of human 
consciousness, Jean-Paul Sartre pointed out that ‘consciousness does 
not cease to have a body’ (Sartre, 1943/1958, p.338). Postulating the 
absence of a physical body, the absence of any spatial extension of 
the phenomenal self, and thus the absence of the potentiality to affect 
(or be affected by) the external world, the emergence of a conscious 
percept of this external world would be absurd (Blanke & Metzinger, 
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2009; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962; 
Sartre, 1943/1958). I cannot perceive space, unless I exist in space.1 
The close connection between body and space representations 
enables an appropriate interaction with the environment (Eilan, 
Marcel, & Bermúdez, 1995; Legrand, Brozzoli, Rossetti, & Farnè, 
2007; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962; van der Hoort, Guterstam, & 
Ehrsson, 2011). To manipulate and modify certain aspects of the 
external world by means of our body, we need information about the 
posture of our body and its physical capabilities, as well as 
information about the spatial relations of our immediate 
surroundings, commonly referred to as peripersonal space (Makin, 
Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Spence, Pavani, Maravita, & Holmes, 
2004). The representations of body and peripersonal space are so 
fundamentally linked that arguments striving for the fusion of both 
concepts have been raised (Cardinali, Brozzoli, & Farnè, 2009a; 
Legrand et al., 2007). 
 
The present thesis deals with the dynamic qualities of body and 
space representations. It has been shown, that representations of 
body and space are not static, but exhibit remarkable dynamic 
capacities. Cortical reorganisation in patients after limb amputation 
(Elbert et al., 1994; Elbert et al., 1997; Yang et al., 1994), altered 
spatial processing induced by tool-use (Cardinali, Frassinetti, 
Brozzoli, Urquizar, Roy, & Farnè, 2009b; Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 
1996; Longo & Lourenco, 2006; Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Yamamoto 
& Kitazawa, 2001) and perceptual disruptions during bodily illusions 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Wiech, Weiskopf, Dolan, & 
Passingham, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; 
Slater et al., 2009) are only some examples to indicate that the 
representations of the body and of peripersonal space are subject to 
many environmental influences. From an evolutionary perspective, 
the plasticity of body and space representations is advantageous and 
necessary, because an appropriate interaction with the environment 
depends on the adaptation to bodily changes, which happen during a 
lifetime necessarily and slow (growth, aging) as well as conditionally 
                                                          
1
 In this sentence, I refers to the phenomenal self, as space refers to phenomenal rather 
than material space, demonstrating that even the idealists’ denial of the existence of 
any spatial extension beyond mental representations cannot minimize the 
interdependency between the phenomenal experience of body and space, which is 
independent from their factual existence. 
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and sudden (limb amputations, loss of sensory and/or motor 
functions due to nerve damage). 
In the first part of this thesis (study 1 and 2), it was questioned to 
what extent the representation of peripersonal space is influenced by 
a postural representation of the body. Systematic variations of body 
posture were investigated with respect to their effects on the 
structure of spatial representations, which, as will be demonstrated, 
can be described in terms of a mental segmentation of peripersonal 
space. 
The second part of the thesis (study 3 and 4) is dedicated to the 
identification of necessary and sufficient preconditions under which 
alterations of body representations occur. Although it is commonly 
recognized that body representations are flexible to a certain degree, 
the limiting factors for this plasticity are partially unknown. By 
varying the experimental methods to induce changes in body 
representations (see section 1.1), necessary prerequisites and limiting 
constraints regarding those changes are explored. 
In short, the first part of the thesis deals with body 
representations as cause, while the second part is concerned with 
body representations as effects. In all four studies, bodily illusions 
were used to investigate the mechanisms of body perception. The 
next section (1.1) is therefore dedicated to the basic idea of this 
approach as well as to the description of the illusions used. Section 
1.2 is destined to introduce and define important concepts and terms, 
which are essential for a complete understanding, section 1.3 gives a 
brief overview over the studies contained in this thesis and in section 
1.4 I will shortly summarize the main objectives. 
1.1 What We Can Learn from Bodily Illusions 
The research on body representations is constrained by the fact 
that it is impossible to experimentally manipulate the presence or 
absence of the body. Every conscious and unconscious percept is 
inevitably accompanied by ‘the feeling of the same old body always 
there’ (James, 1890/1950, vol.1, p.242), rendering it impossible to 
compare the perception of the body with the perception under the 
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condition of an absent body (Tsakiris, 2010). Nevertheless, bodily 
illusions provide useful approaches to investigate some of the 
essential factors for the development and maintenance of body 
representations (Ehrsson, 2007; Geldard & Sherrick, 1972; 
Johannsen, 1971; Shore, Spry, & Spence, 2002; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005). 
The human brain is well adapted to its environment, and in most 
situations the corresponding body is appropriately represented, so 
that errors or malfunction can hardly be observed under normal 
conditions. However, to gain insights into the normal operating 
mode of body representations it is important to specify the conditions 
under which this normal functioning is disturbed (Johannsen, 1971). 
In the present thesis, tactile body illusions were implemented to 
induce specific disruptions of usual body perceptions. These 
deviations from the normal operating mode are a result of unfamiliar 
or even contradictive information (from various senses) about the 
body and its posture. The investigation of body perception under 
such conditions of reduced functionality is an enlightening strategy, 
because specific errors and malfunctions occurring under these 
conditions can reveal important insights about the usual functionality 
of body representations. 
Prominent examples for tactile illusions are Aristotle’s illusion 
(Johannsen, 1971) and the cutaneous rabbit effect (Geldard & 
Sherrick, 1972). Aristotle’s illusion denotes the erroneous sensation 
of two objects, when in fact only one object is held between two 
crossed fingers of the same hand (Johannsen, 1971). In the cutaneous 
rabbit illusion, a rapid and regular sequence of tactile stimuli, the 
first half delivered near the wrist and the second half near the elbow, 
is perceived as being equally distributed between the two actual 
stimulation sites (Flach & Haggard, 2006; Geldard & Sherrick, 
1972). Other perceptual impairments can be evoked by crossing the 
hands (Shore et al., 2002) or the feet (Schicke & Röder, 2006) or 
interleaving the fingers of both hands (Haggard et al., 2006; 
Zampini, Harris, & Spence, 2005). In a similar vein, hand posture 
was manipulated in study 1 and 2 in order to investigate the 
influence of a postural body model on the representation of 
peripersonal space. 
Another well-established bodily illusion is the rubber hand 
illusion (RHI), first described by Botvinick & Cohen (1998). In the 
RHI, the own hand of the participant is concealed behind an 
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occluding screen, while direct vision at an artificial hand2 is 
provided. The unseen real and the visible artificial hand are then 
stroked with two identical paint brushes in a synchronous manner, 
i.e., the felt touches at the own hand coincide with the seen touches 
at the artificial hand. In contrast to a control condition involving 
asynchronous stroking, this procedure results in the participants’ 
illusion that they feel the touches at the observed artificial hand 
rather than at their veridical location. The illusory feeling that the 
artificial hand belongs to one’s own body (usually assessed with a 
questionnaire) is accompanied by a shift of the perceived position of 
the own hand towards the location of the artificial hand. This 
perceptual bias is commonly referred to as proprioceptive drift 
(Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, 
& Dijkerman, 2009a; Tsakiris, 2010), and can be measured by 
asking the participants to indicate the perceived position of their own 
hand by pointing towards it with their non-stimulated hand 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Kammers et al., 2009a) or by verbal 
specification, e.g., with reference to a ruler placed horizontally above 
the hidden own hand (Kammers, Longo, Tsakiris, Dijkerman, & 
Haggard, 2009b; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). 
An alternative version of the same paradigm involves 
synchronous as compared to asynchronous movements of the real 
and the artificial hand (Tsakiris et al., 2006). In contrast to the 
passive induction method, which results in the subjective feeling of 
ownership over the artificial hand, the active induction method is 
capable of inducing a sense of agency, because it is based on the 
sensory integration of motor commands and visual feedback about 
their effects (Tsakiris et al., 2006). In the present thesis, both 
versions of the RHI were directly compared in an attempt to 
disentangle the effects of body ownership and agency on different 
types of body representations (study 3), as well as their implications 
concerning a congenital body-model (study 4). 
                                                          
2
 The label ‘rubber hand illusion (RHI)’ dates from its first application by Botvinick & 
Cohen (1998), in which the artificial hand was made of rubber. 
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1.2 Clarification of Central Concepts 
To provide a basis for a thorough comprehension of the studies 
contained in this thesis, it is appropriate to define some of the basic 
terms and concepts involved. The following sections are dedicated to 
this goal. 
1.2.1 Body, Peripersonal Space and Response Fields 
The distinction between the own body and the external world has 
a long history in philosophy and empirical sciences on the origin of 
human consciousness (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; James, 
1890/1950; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962; Sartre, 1943/1958; van der 
Hoort et al., 2011). The appropriateness of this distinction is implied 
by the fact that every conscious perception would be inconceivable 
without the reference to the first person perspective, the centre of 
which lies within the bodily borders (Blanke & Arzy, 2005; 
Lenggenhager, Mouthon, & Blanke, 2009). This first person 
perspective seems to be an absolutely necessary precondition for the 
development of a minimal phenomenal selfhood (Blanke & 
Metzinger, 2009; Metzinger, 2003; Zahavi, 2005). In other words, I 
cannot perceive an object ‘per se’, I can only perceive an object ‘in 
front of me’, ‘far away from me’, etc. Every perception3 inevitably 
requires the reference to the first person perspective, and thus to the 
body (James, 1890/1950; Sartre, 1943/1958). These considerations 
imply that, in order to adequately interact with the external world, it 
is necessary to differentiate between representations of the own body 
(as the seat of the phenomenal self) and representations of external 
space (as the potentiality for actions) (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010). 
Based on their functional relevance, the representation of external 
space can be further divided into near and far space (Legrand et al., 
                                                          
3
 It might be important to differentiate between perception and imagination. The 
considerations discussed here only refer to directly perceived qualities of the external 
world. I refrain from taking up a position as to whether they are applicable to 
imaginations. 
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2007; Longo & Lourenco, 2007). Spatial areas, which are close to 
the body (and thus to the phenomenal self), are behaviorally more 
relevant and are represented differently compared to more remote 
spatial areas (Longo & Lourenco, 2006; Makin, Holmes, & Zohary, 
2007). The research on different representations of near and far 
space resulted in the concept of peripersonal space, which is defined 
as the space immediately surrounding the body, i.e., within reaching 
distance (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Previc, 1998; Reed, Grubb, & 
Steele, 2006). Apparently, this definition strictly refers to the body 
itself. An altered representation of the body would necessarily imply 
a corresponding change in the representation of peripersonal space 
(Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010), and indeed, the appropriateness of the 
distinction between the concepts of peripersonal space and body 
schema (see section 1.3.3) has been questioned (Cardinali et al., 
2009a). 
There have been many investigations highlighting the extensive 
dynamic qualities with respect to the representation of peripersonal 
space (Holmes, Calvert, & Spence, 2007; Longo & Lourenco, 2007; 
Lourenco & Longo, 2009; Maravita, Husain, Clarke, & Driver, 2001; 
Maravita, Spence, Kennett, & Driver, 2002). The majority of these 
studies were concerned about the effects of tool use on the extension 
of peripersonal space (Iriki et al., 1996; Longo & Lourenco, 2006; 
Maravita & Iriki, 2004) could show that the visual receptive fields of 
bimodal neurons in the brain of macaques were extended to more 
distant spatial areas, after a training to reach these areas with a rake. 
Behavioral correlates of this recalibration of peripersonal space have 
also been reported in human subjects (Longo & Lourenco, 2006; 
Maravita & Iriki, 2004). 
The dynamics of peripersonal space are not confined to 
extensions and contractions of its range, but also affect the relative 
resolution of certain subdivisions within peripersonal space 
(Gillmeister & Forster, 2012; Lloyd, 2007; Làdavas, di Pellegrino, 
Farnè, & Zeloni, 1998; Reed, Betz, Garza, & Roberts, 2010; Short & 
Ward, 2009; Whiteley, Spence, & Haggard, 2008). So are the spatial 
areas immediately surrounding the hands, often referred to as peri-
hand space, overrepresented compared to other spatial areas within 
peripersonal space (Brozzoli, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2012; Làdavas & 
Farnè, 2004; Makin et al., 2008; Reed et al., 2006; Reed et al., 2010). 
Again, this irregular resolution of spatial representations can be 
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explained in terms of a different behavioral relevance (Brozzoli et 
al., 2012; Reed et al., 2006). 
All of these studies demonstrate that the dynamics of 
peripersonal space representations are closely related to variations of 
body posture (especially regarding the hands) and to attentional 
processes (Driver & Grossenbacher, 1996). In study 1 and 2 of the 
present thesis, this relation will be further investigated, and a 
hypothesis concerning a mental segmentation of peripersonal space 
into response fields will be tested. Response fields are defined as 
spatial subdivisions, representing specific body parts. A mental 
segmentation of peripersonal space into response fields was 
hypothesized to facilitate the tactile processing of body parts, 
because the identification of a touched body part would only require 
the localization of the tactile stimulus within a specific response field 
(representing the associated body part), rather than a supplemental 
determination of the body part currently occupying the same spatial 
area. An example of response fields and their dependence on body 
posture is described in the introduction of study 1 and depicted in 
Figure 1. Based on the results of study 1 and 2, response fields are 
proposed as a conceptual framework for the investigation of tactile 
processing of body parts within an external reference system. 
1.2.2 Ownership and Agency 
The distinction between a sense of body ownership and a sense of 
agency as two different aspects of the bodily self has received much 
interest during the last decade (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007b). The function of the human body as 
the mediating interface between the phenomenal self and the external 
world is twofold (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). 
First, the body is perceived as the source of sensations. An 
externally imposed event at the body directly results in a phenomenal 
sensation of that event, the body being the only medium by which 
the external world can exert its influence upon the phenomenal self. 
Contact between a knife and an object on my desk would have no 
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consequences for my phenomenal self4, but if the same knife 
approaches my hand, the anticipation of the phenomenal 
consequences would immediately make me feel uncomfortable. This 
aspect of a bodily self-consciousness is commonly referred to as 
body ownership, reflecting the sense that whatever happens to this 
body, happens to me (within the meaning of the phenomenal self). 
Second, the body is perceived as a medium to manipulate and 
modify the external world. Intended changes within the environment 
can only be imposed by means of motor control over the body. For 
all intents and purposes, the influence of the phenomenal self upon 
the external world is indirect, mediated by the body. In order to 
move the knife on my desk, I first have to reach for it with my hand, 
whereas the body movement itself can be executed directly5. This 
second aspect of bodily self-consciousness is termed agency and 
describes the sense that I can affect my environment only via this 
body. 
Body ownership and agency both result in a strongly perceived 
association between the body and the phenomenal self, and, in this 
vein, contribute to the development of a bodily self (Gallagher, 2005; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). 
The distinction between body ownership and agency has 
stimulated numerous empirical investigations (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2012; Kammers et al., 2009b; Longo & Haggard, 2009; Tsakiris et 
al., 2006; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010) as well as theoretical 
considerations (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris et al., 2007b), but the 
interrelation between both concepts remains an unresolved question. 
Some studies suggest them to be disjunctive aspects of the bodily 
self, absolutely independent from each other (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
Newen, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010), while others favour an additive 
model, proposing a common basis sufficient for ownership and 
                                                          
4
 For the sake of simplicity and due to the objective of this thesis, the example is 
restricted to somatosensation. Of course, other senses (e.g., vision) are not reliant on 
bodily contact, and can transfer remote external events to alterations in the 
phenomenal self. However, even those events are perceived from the first-person 
perspective of the body. Regarding vision, I do not perceive a knife approaching an 
object, but a knife approaching an object far away from me. 
5
 The fact that motor intentions and body movements are also mediated by efferent 
nerve pulses does not derogate the argument of phenomenal immediacy, because those 
mediating processes are not consciously perceived. Phenomenal immediacy is even 
regarded as an essential precondition to enable adequate motor control (Prinz, 1992; 
Sartre, 1943/1958). 
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necessary for agency and a supplementary condition necessary for 
the development of agency (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010). According 
to this latter view, body ownership can be maintained without a 
sense of agency, whereas agency would necessarily imply a sense of 
ownership. Indeed, there are some clinical syndromes (anarchic hand 
syndrome, delusions of control in schizophrenic patients) reflecting 
the case of a disturbed sense of agency coincidentally with a 
preserved sense of ownership (Frith, 2005; Marchetti & Della Sala, 
1998), while there are no reports of the reversed case (disrupted 
ownership with preserved agency)6. Nevertheless, arguments for the 
independence hypothesis are provided by the observation of distinct 
neural networks activated during the induction of ownership and 
agency (Tsakiris et al., 2010). 
Irrespective of the relation between ownership and agency, it has 
been shown that they affect the perception of the body in a 
qualitatively different manner. By comparing the perceptual effects 
of passive tactile stimulation and active finger movements within the 
RHI, Tsakiris et al. (2006) found that the perceived spatial 
displacement was restricted to the stimulated finger in the passive 
induction method, while it was spread over the whole hand in the 
active induction method. Voluntary control over the movements of 
an artificial hand, giving rise to the emergence of agency, seem to 
have a more widespread effect on body representations, whereas 
tactile stimulation seems to exclusively affect the touched body part 
(Tsakiris et al., 2006). 
Based on these results, it is plausible to assume a greater 
importance of the anatomical congruence between motor commands 
and their bodily effects (resulting in a sense of agency) than between 
tactile stimuli at the body and their sensory consequences (resulting 
in a sense of ownership), a hypothesis which was tested in study 4 of 
the present thesis. 
                                                          
6
 Somatoparaphrenia might be a candidate, but it co-occurs with motor and 
somatosensory deficits, impeding the assessment of agency (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). 
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1.2.3 Body Image and Body Schema 
Since the original conceptualization by Head & Holmes (1911) 
the distinction between two different kinds of body representations 
has been confirmed in various studies and is generally approved in 
the scientific literature (de Vignemont, 2010; Gallagher, 2005; 
Kammers et al., 2009a; Paillard, 1999). Based on clinical 
observations of discrete functional deficits in neurological patients, 
Head & Holmes (1911) proposed the existence of at least two body 
representations, which are commonly referred to as body image and 
body schema7 (Gallagher, 2005). 
The body image contains the sum of conscious perceptions and 
attitudes towards one’s own body, and is accompanied by a high 
level of consciousness. The content of the body image varies with 
the attention towards specific aspects or parts of the body, i.e., it 
does not consist in a holistic representation, but rather in ‘an abstract 
and partial perception of the body’ (Gallagher, 2005, p.57). 
The body schema refers to a pre-conscious representation of the 
body serving as an implicit frame of reference for the execution and 
guidance of goal-directed movements, which usually do not require 
conscious monitoring (e.g., walking, grasping objects, etc.). It is 
described as a ‘combined standard, against which all subsequent 
changes of posture are measured before they enter consciousness’ 
(Head & Holmes, 1911, p.187). Accordingly, the body schema 
operates within an external frame of reference, i.e., behaviorally 
relevant visual information and bodily sensations are processed with 
respect to their coordinates in peripersonal space. The extent to 
which specific body parts (e.g., hands and fingers) are included in 
this spatial body representation was investigated in study 1. 
The conceptual distinction between body image and body schema 
is confirmed by a double dissociation revealed by clinical case 
studies (Gallagher, 2005; Head & Holmes, 1911). Deafferentation, a 
neurological condition indicating the loss of somatosensation and 
proprioception from the neck downwards due to nerve damage, 
forms one side of this dissociation, i.e., the case of a disturbed body 
schema, while the body image is preserved (Cole & Paillard, 1995; 
                                                          
7
 The original term introduced by Head & Holmes (1911) is ‘postural schema’. 
According to conventions in the more recent literature, the established term ‘body 
schema’ will be used here. 
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Gallagher & Cole, 1995; Paillard, 1999). Unilateral neglect and 
tactile blindsight are examples for the reversed pattern, the 
coincidence of a defective body image and an intact body schema 
(Gallagher, 2005; Paillard, 1999; Rossetti, Rode, & Boisson, 1995). 
Based on the distinction between a sense of ownership and a 
sense of agency (see section 1.3.1), Kammers et al. (2009b) 
suggested that these two aspects of the bodily self should differently 
affect the body image and the body schema. The body image (in 
contrast to the body schema) should be modifiable by manipulating 
the sense of body ownership, because the feeling of ownership is 
elicited by passively experienced tactile sensations and is not 
associated with movements. This is exactly what was found in 
another study by the same group (Kammers et al., 2009a), although 
the proposed influence of a sense of agency on the body schema 
could not be confirmed (Kammers et al., 2009b). The absence of 
body-schematic alterations after the experimental manipulation of 
agency, however, might be due to the experimental design, because 
in the study of Kammers et al. (2009b), as in many others (Longo & 
Haggard, 2009; Newport, Pearce, & Preston, 2010; Tsakiris et al., 
2006), agency was induced over a spatially displaced video-image of 
the participants’ real hand, which presumably is very different from 
inducing agency over an unequivocally body-extraneous object 
(Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Study 3 of the present thesis focuses on 
this issue by implementing a version of the RHI based on active 
motor control over an unambiguously artificial hand. 
1.2.4 Congenital Body-Model 
A critical issue with respect to body representations consists in 
the question whether the way we perceive our body develops in early 
childhood depending on postnatal learning mechanisms or whether it 
is based on a congenital default model of the human body, also 
referred to as pre-existing body-model (De Preester & Tsakiris, 
2009). The discussion about the existence and the plasticity of a 
congenital body-model has a long history in the research on body 
perception, yet it still remains undetermined. The reason for its 
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intricacy apparently stems from the fact that there is convincing 
evidence for both the rigidness and the plasticity of body 
representations, which will be exemplified in the following. 
The phenomenon of aplasic phantoms, i.e., the perception of 
phantom sensations from congenitally deficient limbs, highly 
suggests the existence of a congenital body-model (Brugger et al., 
2000; Gallagher, Butterworth, Lew, & Cole, 1998; Ramachandran, 
1993). These phantom sensations can occur during the whole life-
span of the patients, in spite of the absolute absence of any sensory 
afferences from the respective limb (Melzack, Israel, Lacroix, & 
Schultz, 1997). These clinical cases show that the subjective 
experience of a body part does not necessarily depend on sensory-
motor contingencies regarding the specific body part. The 
anatomical configuration of the body seems not to be learned, but to 
be congenitally available and resistant to inconsistent sensory 
information. Although these clinical observations reinforce the 
conception of a congenital body-model, alternative explanations for 
the phenomenon of aplasic phantoms have been proposed (Price, 
2006). 
Further evidence for a congenital body-model is provided by 
experimental studies, revealing several anatomical constraints 
regarding the alteration of body representations (Costantini & 
Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Graziano, 
Cooke, & Taylor, 2000; Haans, Ijsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008; 
Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Several examples indicate that the 
temporal synchrony between tactile and visual stimulation is, though 
a necessary, not a sufficient factor for the occurrence of the RHI 
(Tsakiris, 2010). The effects of the illusion have been shown to 
vanish, when the artificial hands were arranged in an anatomically 
impossible posture (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris 
& Haggard, 2005), and to be substantially diminished, when the 
artificial hands were replaced by neutral, body-unrelated objects 
(Haans et al., 2008; Holmes et al., 2006; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; 
but see Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). These findings demonstrate 
that specific anatomical attributes of the artificial hand are required 
for the RHI, and that the perceived incorporation of body-extraneous 
objects depends on a priori conceptions regarding the anatomical 
structure of the human body. 
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Other studies, however, illustrate a considerable flexibility of 
body representations, even beyond the limits of anatomical 
discrepancies (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Braun et al., 2001; 
Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Moseley & Brugger, 2009; 
Schaefer, Flor, Heinze, & Rotte, 2007; Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 
2008; Schaefer, Heinze, & Rotte, 2009). In a series of brain imaging 
studies, Schaefer et al. (2007; 2008; 2009) could show that bodily 
illusions, induced by visual exposure to an altered configuration of 
the body, modulated the topography of the primary somatosensory 
cortex. Most importantly, these short-lived alterations in the primary 
somatosensory cortex occurred after visual exposure to anatomically 
implausible (e.g., a lengthened arm, Schaefer et al., 2007) and even 
anatomically impossible bodily changes (e.g., a third arm, Schaefer 
et al., 2009; see also Guterstam et al., 2011). 
Further evidence for the plasticity of body representations is 
provided by experiments on tool-use. After a certain period of 
handling a tool, altered representations of the body have repeatedly 
been reported (Cardinali et al., 2009b; Cardinali et al., 2011; 
Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001). The original conceptualization of the 
body schema already highlights the capability of projecting the sense 
of posture and movement ‘beyond the limits of our own bodies to the 
end of some instrument held in the hand’ (Head & Holmes, 1911, 
p.188). The perceptual and behavioral effects of tool-use vividly 
demonstrate the impressive dynamic qualities of body 
representations (De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009; Head & Holmes, 
1911; Johnson-Frey, 2003; Longo & Lourenco, 2006; Maravita & 
Iriki, 2004). 
In summary, body representations definitely exhibit a certain 
degree of flexibility, but they are not unlimited. As mentioned 
initially, the constraints on the plasticity of body representations has 
generated the assumption of a congenital body-model (De Preester & 
Tsakiris, 2009; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The fact that body-
schematic alterations after tool-use depend on the active 
manipulation of the tool suggests a high involvement of motor 
processes. The importance of the motor system for representational 
changes of the body has also been shown in other studies (Braun et 
al., 2001; Moseley & Brugger, 2009; Schaefer, Flor, Heinze, & 
Rotte, 2005). Therefore it is possible that the influence of a 
congenital body-model depends on whether alterations of body 
representations are induced by active voluntary movements or by 
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passive tactile sensations. In study 4 of this thesis, this issue was 
investigated by comparing the effects of anatomically incongruent 
feedback within a passive and an active version of the RHI (see 
section 1.1). 
1.3 Overview of the Studies 
The present thesis deals with the questions (i) to what extent 
postural body representations modulate the representation of 
peripersonal space and (ii) to what extent body representations can 
be modulated by spatially displaced visual feedback regarding 
passive touches at the body and active movements of the body. This 
section is designed as a brief common overview of the four studies 
and might be helpful for a first overall impression. However, it does 
not intend to provide a comprehensive description of the studies’ 
details, for which the reader should consult the respective chapters. 
 
Study 1 It was examined whether the tactile processing of body 
parts was modulated by postural representations of the body. 
Participants received tactile stimuli at the fingertips of their index 
and middle fingers while holding their hands either in a vertical or a 
woven posture (Figure 1) and were asked to discriminate as fast as 
possible either between stimuli at their right vs. left hand, or between 
stimuli at their index vs. middle fingers. Besides the contribution to 
the controversially discussed question as to whether single fingers 
are included in a postural representation of the body, study 1 set the 
basis for the hypothesis of response fields. 
 
Study 2 We tested three characteristics of response fields, which 
were proposed on the basis of the results from study 1. Again, tactile 
stimuli were applied to the fingertips of the participants’ index and 
middle fingers, while participants had to identify the laterality of the 
stimulated hand. In experiment 1, hands were held in an adjacent or a 
separated posture (Figure 6a), modulating the spatial distance 
between response fields for the right and the left hand. In experiment 
2 and 3, participants held their hands in a right-enclosed or a left-
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enclosed posture (Figure 7a), varying the size and the number of 
response fields. Although the results of study 2 confirmed the basic 
idea of response fields, an important modulation regarding the 
characteristics of size and number was brought forward. 
 
Study 3 By presenting spatially displaced visual feedback 
regarding passive tactile stimuli at (or active movements of) the 
participants’ right index finger within the paradigm of the RHI, we 
investigated the relative contribution of a sense of ownership and a 
sense of agency with respect to changes in body representations. 
Effects on body representations were assessed by phenomenal self-
reports, a perceptual and a behavioral measure of proprioceptive 
drift. Study 3 was designed to disentangle alterations of the body 
image and the body schema (see section 1.2.3). 
 
Study 4 It was investigated whether the influence of a congenital 
body-model (see section 1.2.4) differs depending on the induction 
method for the RHI. Passive tactile stimuli at (or active movements 
of) the participants’ right index and middle finger were accompanied 
by visual feedback at an artificial hand. The visual feedback was 
varied according to its anatomical congruence (whether anatomically 
corresponding fingers at the real and the artificial hand were 
stimulated or moved) and coupling consistency (whether the 
coupling between real and artificial fingers varied). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Introduction 17 
1.4 Aims and Scope 
In this section, the main research questions of the present thesis 
as well as methodological aims are summarized. 
1.4.1 Dynamics of Spatial Representations 
The first part of the thesis (study 1 and 2) is concerned with the 
influence of body posture on the representation of peripersonal space 
(see section 1.2.1). A mental segmentation of peripersonal space into 
task-relevant subdivisions was hypothesized to account for the 
spatial processing of tactile stimuli within an external reference 
system. This mental segmentation of space was expected to depend 
on the postural representation of the body as well as on the amount 
of attentional resources focused on specific body parts. The 
hypothesis was tested in study 1, resulting in the conceptualization of 
response fields. The primary goal of study 2 consisted in the 
validation and further elaboration of response fields, which will be 
discussed as a conceptual framework for the processing of tactile 
stimuli within an external frame of reference. 
1.4.2 Dynamics of Body Representations 
A central concern of the second part of the thesis (study 3 and 4) 
was to determine necessary preconditions as well as limiting factors 
for alterations of body representations. Several factors were tested 
regarding their capability to induce the RHI, the subjective 
embodiment of an artificial hand. 
Specifically, we examined the influence of top-down processes 
on the occurrence and the strength of the RHI. In many studies on 
the RHI (especially those implementing active movements) video 
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images or mirror reflections of the own hand were presented as 
‘artificial’ hands, which raises issues as to whether the perceptual 
incorporation of these images can be accounted for solely by top-
down processes. In fact, the participants are looking at their own 
hand, though the image is spatially displaced. To test for this 
possibility, an unambiguously body-extraneous object (a movable 
wooden hand) was used in study 3 and 4. 
The assumption of a congenital body-model (see section 1.3.4) 
predicts the importance of an anatomically congruent coupling 
between fingers at the real and the artificial hand as a necessary 
precondition for the RHI. Similar anatomical constraints have been 
reported in other studies (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Haans et al., 2008; 
Holmes et al., 2006; Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
In study 4 the impact of anatomical congruence was tested against 
the impact of the consistency of this coupling. 
1.4.3 Body Ownership and Agency 
The distinction between a sense of body ownership and a sense of 
agency (see section 1.2.2) implicates different processing strategies 
for passive tactile sensations at and active voluntary movements of 
the own body. The investigation of this issue was another aim of this 
thesis. 
Study 3 examined differential effects of passive touch and active 
movements within the RHI on the body image and the body schema 
(see section 1.2.3). In order to disentangle alterations specific for 
these functionally different body representations, we compared the 
performance in a perceptual task (presumably based on the body 
image) with that in a motor task (presumably based on the body 
schema). This question was addressed previously by Kammers et al. 
(2009b), but due to the implementation of an advanced method for 
the induction of the RHI in study 3 (see next paragraph on 
methodological aims) further informative results were expected, and 
firmer conclusions could be drawn. 
In study 4 we assessed the differential impact of a congenital 
body-model with respect to the development of a sense of body 
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ownership as compared to a sense of agency. The importance of 
anatomical congruence of the coupling between fingers of the real 
and the artificial hand was compared for passive touches and active 
movements within the RHI. 
1.4.4 Methodological Aims 
The present thesis involved two methodological objectives, the 
first of which consisted in the implementation of a new procedure for 
the RHI paradigm based on active motor control over an 
unambiguously artificial hand. To enable voluntary movements of 
artificial hands, many authors used video-based (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 
2006) or mirror-based (e.g., Holmes et al., 2006) versions of the 
RHI, which seem questionable when the object of investigation is the 
perceived incorporation of an artificial hand, definitely not 
belonging to the own body. The general principle of the new method 
was validated in study 3 and it was applied and further elaborated in 
study 4. 
Second, a new procedure for the assessment of proprioceptive 
drift within the RHI was implemented and validated in study 3, 
allowing for the calculation of a parameter for discrimination 
performance. This procedure is the first to enable the specification of 
the degree of certainty for judgements about body posture, an aspect 
of the RHI which has not been considered in previous studies. This 
procedure was successfully applied in study 3 and 4. 
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2 Study 1: A Mental Segmentation of 
Peripersonal Space Depends on Body 
Posture 
It is an unresolved question whether single fingers are 
represented within a spatial frame of reference. The two experiments 
in study 1 investigated the impact of postural representations of the 
body on the processing of tactile stimuli at the fingers and hands. 
Healthy subjects received two simultaneous tactile stimuli at the 
fingertips while the fingers of both hands were either interleaved or 
not. In speeded response tasks, they were asked to discriminate 
(experiment 1) or to identify (experiment 2) the touched body parts, 
either regarding hand laterality or finger type. The results 
demonstrate that both finger discrimination and finger identification 
are influenced by body posture. We conclude that the assumption of 
a solely somatotopic representation of fingers is not tenable and that 
an external reference system must be available for the processing of 
tactile stimuli at the fingers. The results are discussed in terms of a 
mental segmentation of peripersonal space, based on a postural 
representation of the body and task requirements. 
2.1 Introduction 
Tactile stimuli can be localized within somatotopic and external 
frames of reference  (Azañón & Soto-Faraco, 2008; Head & Holmes, 
1911; Kim & Cruse, 2001). These two reference systems differ in 
their dependence on body posture. While the somatotopic 
coordinates of specific body parts do not change with different 
postures of the body, their external spatial coordinates do (Driver & 
Grossenbacher, 1996; Kitazawa, 2002; Lloyd, Shore, Spence, & 
Calvert, 2003; Pellijeff, Bonilha, Morgan, McKenzie, & Jackson, 
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2006; Röder, Spence, & Rösler, 2002; Shore et al., 2002; Soto-
Faraco, Ronald, & Spence, 2004). 
Many studies have addressed the question whether hands and 
fingers can be processed within an external reference system 
(Azañón & Soto-Faraco, 2007; J. C. Craig, 2003; Haggard et al., 
2006; Schicke & Röder, 2006; Schicke, Bauer, & Röder, 2009; 
Shore et al., 2002; Shore, Gray, Spry, & Spence, 2005). There is 
agreement about the representation of the hands’ posture in external 
coordinates, but the findings concerning such a representation of 
single fingers are inconsistent. Many authors doubt the integration of 
single fingers within an external frame of reference, referring to 
illusory perceptions like Aristotle’s illusion, which is the deceptive 
feeling of two objects when actually only one object is held between 
two crossed fingers (Johannsen, 1971). This illusion has repeatedly 
been interpreted as reflecting the brain’s inability to update the 
fingers’ posture relative to each other (Benedetti, 1985; Benedetti, 
1988). Indeed, in some studies no postural influence on finger 
processing was found (Benedetti, 1985; Benedetti, 1988; Haggard et 
al., 2006). Other investigations, however, provided evidence that 
finger processing is affected by body posture (J. C. Craig & Busey, 
2003; J. C. Craig, 2003; Shore et al., 2005). 
In an attempt to resolve the inconsistencies on this issue we 
identified three aspects, which have to be accounted for when 
investigating hand and finger representations in peripersonal space: 
task comparability, information value and the spatial distance 
between related body parts. These three aspects will be specified in 
the following. 
The first aspect relates to the comparability of the experimental 
tasks. In order to compare between hand and finger processing, it is 
important to ensure the analogousness of the experimental tasks. 
Ideally, they should differ only with respect to task instructions (i.e., 
whether attention is directed to the distinction of hands or to the 
distinction of single fingers). Therefore, an excellent method is 
provided by the analysis of the processing strategies of tactile stimuli 
applied to the fingertips. This approach allows direct comparison of 
hand and finger representations, because one and the same stimulus 
can be processed both with respect to hand laterality and finger type 
(i.e., index, middle) (Haggard et al., 2006). 
The second aspect consists in the reduction of uncertainty 
regarding the stimulus’ location in peripersonal space. In terms of 
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information value (Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; McFall & Treat, 
1999), distinguishing between the hands provides much more spatial 
information than distinguishing between finger types. Having 
identified the laterality of a touched hand, we can specify the 
stimulus’ location within the space near that hand, even if the 
touched finger remains unknown. In contrast, identification of the 
touched finger type, without taking into account the laterality of the 
associated hand, confronts us with more uncertainty regarding the 
stimulus’ external coordinates. Given a possibly larger distance 
between two fingers of the same type (i.e., between two hands), the 
stimulus cannot be constrained to a circumscribed area in 
peripersonal space. Its location might differ highly depending on the 
associated hand. Thus, when touched at a specific finger, humans 
might automatically process the laterality of the associated hand, 
even if they are explicitly asked to ignore it. Similar effects of task-
irrelevant information have frequently been reported in various 
studies (Simon & Acosta, 1982). 
The third aspect is the spatial distance between related and 
unrelated body parts (determined by task demands). Within an 
external frame of reference, tactile stimuli are localized with respect 
to external spatial coordinates (Azañón & Soto-Faraco, 2007; 
Azañón & Soto-Faraco, 2008; Kitazawa, 2002). By determining the 
part of the body which is currently occupying that space, one can 
infer the stimulated body part. In order to identify the laterality of a 
touched hand, it would be beneficial to mentally subdivide 
peripersonal space into two discrete areas, defined by the position of 
the hands. Each area would then represent one of the two response 
alternatives (i.e., the right or the left hand). Such a mental 
segmentation of peripersonal space would facilitate performance, 
because hand identification would only require the distinction of two 
discrete spatial areas and the localization of the stimulus within one 
of these areas. The spatial proximity of fingers of the same hand, as 
well as the spatial distance between fingers of different hands might 
serve as a basis for a better identification of hands within an external 
reference frame (Driver & Grossenbacher, 1996; Kim & Cruse, 
2001; Shore et al., 2005; Soto-Faraco et al., 2004). Changing the task 
requirements from hand to finger processing, the same principles 
would suggest a perceptual advantage for other postures: fingers of 
the same type should be spatially close to each other, while fingers 
of different types should be spatially distant. 
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Figure 1 a) Postural conditions and b) task-relevant subdivisions of 
peripersonal space for hand and finger tasks in experiments 1 and 2 of study 1. 
Dotted circles indicate areas representing the response ‘right hand’ or ‘index 
finger’, respectively. 
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The effects of the spatial distance between related and unrelated 
fingers can be investigated by the experimental modification of hand 
postures (Driver & Grossenbacher, 1996; Kim & Cruse, 2001; Shore 
et al., 2002; Shore et al., 2005; Soto-Faraco et al., 2004). A sound 
method is to compare a posture, in which the fingers of both hands 
are interleaved, and a posture, in which the fingers are ordered 
according to the associated hand. Variations of these postural 
conditions have been implemented in several studies (Haggard et al., 
2006; Röder et al., 2002; Zampini et al., 2005). Another example, 
restricted to index and middle fingers of both hands, is depicted in 
Figure 1a. 
 
The postulated segmentation of peripersonal space into task-
relevant areas is differently affected by the vertical and the woven 
posture, depending on task requirements (Figure 1b). Regarding 
hand processing, related fingers are adjacent in the vertical, but not 
in the woven posture. The former allows the mental construction of 
two discrete areas, while in the latter hands cannot clearly be 
assigned to one spatial area each, because these are overlapping. 
Each hand is no longer represented by one broad, connected area, but 
by two smaller ones, which are separated by areas occupied by 
fingers of the other hand. This relation is reversed for finger 
processing, because here it is the woven posture in which related 
fingers are adjacent (Figure 1). According to these considerations, 
we assume that processing of hand laterality would be facilitated 
during the vertical posture, while processing of finger type would 
profit from the woven posture. 
However, in a recent study by Haggard et al. (2006), a postural 
effect was found only for the processing of hands. Participants 
received single tactile stimuli at their fingertips and were asked to 
indicate the laterality of the stimulated hand or the type of the 
stimulated finger, respectively. While hand identification was indeed 
enhanced during the vertical as compared to the woven posture, no 
perceptual advantage was found for finger identification, neither 
during the vertical nor the woven posture (Haggard et al., 2006). 
This finding was interpreted as contradicting the representation of 
single fingers within an external reference system. 
Our considerations about information value and the hypothesized 
converse effects of the postural conditions regarding hand and finger 
processing suggest an alternative explanation for the absence of a 
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postural effect on finger identification in Haggard et al. (2006). Due 
to implicit hand processing during the finger task, the facilitating 
effect of the woven posture on finger identification could have 
interfered with the impeding effect of the same postural condition on 
hand identification. Similarly, a decrease in finger identification 
performance during the vertical posture may have been obscured by 
improved hand identification during that posture. Advantageous and 
disadvantageous effects could have compensated for each other, 
thereby concealing any postural influences on the finger 
identification task. 
In the present study we investigate the effects of the vertical and 
the woven posture on tactile processing of hands and fingers. We 
claim that single fingers can be processed within an external frame 
of reference, and that the woven posture facilitates finger processing. 
Both experiments of the present study were conducted as an attempt 
to suppress implicit hand processing during the finger task and to 
seek evidence for postural influences on the processing of single 
fingers. 
2.2 Experiment 1 
In experiment 1, two tactile stimuli were applied synchronously 
to the tips of the index fingers and the middle fingers of both hands, 
while participants were adopting one of two postural conditions. In 
the vertical posture, index and middle finger of the right hand were 
placed vertically above the ones of the left hand. In the woven 
posture, index and middle fingers of both hands were interleaved, 
with the right index finger on top (Figure 1a). Participants were 
asked for equality judgements, i.e., they had to determine whether 
the stimuli were applied to the same or to different hands, in the hand 
discrimination task8, and to the same or to different finger types, in 
the finger discrimination task, respectively. 
                                                          
8
 The difference between equality judgements and explicit naming of body parts (or 
categories of body parts) consists in the need for exact identification. Equality 
judgements do not require identification, but instead can be based solely on the 
discrimination of body parts. To account for these deviant requirements we will 
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The experimental tasks are based on those implemented by 
Haggard et al. (2006), but vary in three details. These three details 
are related to the three important aspects concerning investigations 
of hand and finger processing in peripersonal space, namely task 
comparability, information value and the spatial distance between 
related fingers. 
First, each trial consisted of two simultaneously delivered stimuli 
rather than one, and participants were asked for equality judgements 
concerning these stimuli rather than for identification of a touched 
body part. This method was applied by Haggard et al. (2006, exp. 2) 
only for the hand task. The essential consequence of this 
modification relates to the information value of hand and finger 
processing. Supplemental hand processing during the finger task 
provides no incremental information concerning the external location 
of the stimuli, since targets (i.e., stimulation of both fingers of the 
same type) involve the stimulation of both hands anyway. 
Furthermore, due to the adjustment of response modes 
(‘same/different’ in both tasks rather than ‘right/left’ in the hand task 
and ‘index/middle’ in the finger task) the task comparability is 
enhanced. 
Second, stimulation was restricted to the index fingers and the 
middle fingers of both hands, as in experiment 4 of Haggard et al. 
(2006). This constraint yields considerable advantages for the 
comparability of the areas that are occupied by related fingers during 
both tasks (Figure 1b). Moreover, task comparability is warranted by 
equal numbers of possible stimulus combinations between the tasks 
(Figure 3). 
Third, only index and middle fingers were arranged according to 
the postural conditions (Figure 1a). Hence, in the vertical posture the 
right middle and the left index finger were adjacent, rather than 
being separated by ring and little finger of the right hand, as it has 
been the case in Haggard et al. (2006). As a consequence, the spatial 
distance between the four relevant fingers is equal for both postural 
conditions, though the configuration of task-related subdivisions of 
peripersonal space is inversely affected by them (Figure 1b). 
According to our considerations about a mental segmentation of 
peripersonal space, we hypothesized a facilitating effect on finger 
                                                                                                               
distinguish between identification and discrimination tasks. According to this label 
distinction, identification tasks were used in Haggard et al. (2006, except exp. 2) while 
we will implement discrimination tasks in experiment 1. 
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discrimination during the woven posture, when homologous fingers 
are adjacent to each other. Enhanced performance for finger 
discrimination during the woven posture would strongly suggest a 
processing of fingers within an external reference system. In 
contrast, if fingers are only processed within a somatotopic frame of 
reference, no postural effect should be observable in the finger 
discrimination task. 
More precisely, for the hand discrimination task, we 
hypothesized shorter reaction times and fewer errors during the 
vertical as compared to the woven posture. For the finger 
discrimination task, shorter reaction times and fewer errors were 
expected during the woven as compared to the vertical posture. 
2.2.1 Methods 
Participants Twelve healthy participants, recruited from the 
University of Mannheim and from the local community, took part in 
the study. They were either paid for their participation or received 
credit points for participating in an experiment (for psychology 
students). Data from one participant had to be excluded from the 
analyses because of problems in the technical set-up. Mean age of 
the remaining eleven participants (4 males) was 24.4 years. All but 
one were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants gave written informed 
consent to the experiment. 
In addition to the assessment of handedness, participants were 
asked about past injuries at the hands or fingers (e.g., bone fractures) 
as well as about frequent activities involving precise finger 
coordination (e.g., playing musical instruments). All reported 
injuries (18%) were completely healed, and six participants had been 
playing musical instruments for at least five years. 
 
Experimental set-up Participants were seated in front of an 
occluding screen, which deprived them of the view of their hands. 
The hands rested comfortably on pillows, in a manner that allowed 
only the index and the middle fingers to reach the body midline. The 
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other fingers and the thumbs were placed at the ipsilateral side and 
were prevented from getting in touch with their counterparts on the 
contralateral hand (Figure 1a). 
Tactile stimuli were delivered via miniature solenoids (RS 
Components, model 330-5213) attached to the fingertips with thin 
strips of adhesive tape. To enable the solenoid pins to swing back to 
their original position after stimulation, plastic nuts with a width of 
4mm were fixed between the solenoids and the skin of the fingertips, 
thus keeping a constant distance. Stimulus duration was set to 20ms, 
which was sufficient to induce a well-noticeable tactile sensation. 
Active noise-cancelling headphones (Audio Technica ATH-ANC7, 
QuietPoint®) were used to reduce acoustic disturbance caused by the 
solenoids. 
Motor responses were given via two foot pedals, one of them 
indicating a ‘same’ and the other one indicating a ‘different’ 
judgement. The lateral meaning of the foot pedals was randomized 
across subjects. Within subjects, the denotation of the foot pedals 
was kept constant during the experiment, in order to avoid confusion. 
Visual reminders with verbal descriptions of their meaning were 
attached to the occluding screen. 
The tasks were presented in randomized order. The order of the 
two postural conditions was randomized only within the respective 
task, so that each task was accomplished successively in both 
postures. This constraint should reduce confusion due to the changes 
in task requirements. Each block consisted of 60 single trials, so each 
of the six possible stimulus combinations (Figure 3) was applied ten 
times in randomized order. The intertrial interval between the 
subjects’ response and the onset of the following stimulus 
combination was approximately normally distributed within a range 
of three to five seconds. Stimulus sequences were controlled using 
Presentation v12.2 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., CA, USA). 
Previous to each block, the experimenter helped the participants 
to arrange their hands in the correct manner. Participants were 
instructed about the type of the following task (finger vs. hand 
discrimination) and were asked to respond as accurately and as 
quickly as possible. Participants were told to keep their eyes open 
and to focus on a black cross, which was fixed to the occluding 
screen in front of them. 
We tested for mechanical transmission of the tactile stimuli, i.e., 
the possibility that the impulses caused by the solenoids are carried 
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over from the stimulated to adjacent fingers. Participants interleaved 
their hand with that of a second person and stimuli were applied only 
to the second person’s fingers. A slight tremor spreading from 
stimulated to adjacent fingers occurred, which was very low but, in 
the absence of direct stimulation, could be reliably detected (100%). 
Yet, during the whole length of the experiment, all participants 
consistently reported the perception of exactly two touches per trial, 
indicating that mechanical transmission did not interfere with the 
perception of the stimuli. Moreover, it has been shown that the 
marginal effect of mechanical transmission results in a trend towards 
faster responses in the vertical as compared to the woven posture, 
irrespective of task type (Haggard et al., 2006). With regard to the 
present study, this means that reaction times would be slightly 
underestimated in the vertical condition and overestimated in the 
woven condition, assuming the occurrence of any influence at all. 
Thus, since the direction of a potential effect of mechanical 
transmission would have been contrary to the hypothesized postural 
effect on finger processing, it does not require further consideration. 
 
Statistical analysis Trials with reaction times longer than 
3000ms9 were excluded from statistical analysis. This time window 
was sufficient to respond to the tactile stimuli via the foot pedals, 
and only 2% of all trials across subjects had to be excluded due to 
longer reaction times. Furthermore, statistical analysis of reaction 
times was restricted to correct trials only (88% of valid trials). 
To cope with outliers, statistical and descriptive analysis was 
based on averaged median values, which were calculated for each 
subject and for every combination of task type and hand posture. As 
far as possible, error rates were analyzed according to signal 
detection theory (SDT) and are reported by means of the statistic d’. 
Due to occasional extreme hit rates of 1, a loglinear transformation 
(Hautus, 1995) was applied to the data before hit and false-alarm 
rates were calculated. 
                                                          
9
 This cut-off value is higher than that used in experiment 4 of Haggard et al. (2006), 
which was set to 2000ms. It accounts for the fact that discriminating between two 
stimuli requires more time than identifying a single stimulus (Haggard et al., 2006). 
The cut-off value of 3000ms lies within 2.7 standard deviations above the mean of 
reaction times. Nevertheless, applying different cut-off values (2000ms and 5000ms) 
to the data produced the same results. 
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Statistical analysis was performed with SPSS 16.0, using a linear 
mixed-effects model. Linear mixed models account for random 
effects, such as inter-individual differences (West, Welch, & 
Galecki, 2007). A 2x2 factorial design was applied to the data, with 
both task type and postural condition constituting single fixed 
factors. 
2.2.2 Results 
Results of experiment 1 are presented in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
Main effects on reaction times of task type (F1,30=28.8, p<.001) and 
posture (F1,30=6.2, p=.018) were significant, but the interaction effect 
of task type and posture (F1,30=2.9, p=.096) was not. Nevertheless, it 
 
Figure 2 Median reaction times and error rates (d’) during hand (H) and finger 
(F) discrimination in experiment 1 of study 1. Note that higher values of d’ 
indicate fewer errors. Error bars show standard error across subjects. 
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can be inferred from Table 1 and Figure 2 that the postural effect 
was almost entirely restricted to the hand discrimination task. 
Regarding error rates, only the main effect of task type 
(F1,30=25.9, p<.001) reached statistical significance, while the main 
effect of posture (F1,30=1.8, p=.191) and the interaction of task and 
posture (F1,30=1.5, p=.236) did not. However, error rates show a 
trend towards the same pattern as was observed for reaction times 
(Figure 2, note that higher values of d’ indicate better performance). 
The absolute difference in mean d’ for hand discrimination was .54 
and only .03 for finger discrimination (Table 1). 
At the highest level of aggregation the data did not reveal the 
hypothesized postural effect on finger discrimination. Neither 
reaction times nor error rates during the finger discrimination task 
were affected by the postural conditions (Figure 2). A postural 
influence was found only on hand discrimination. Overall reaction 
times and error rates were significantly higher in the finger than in 
the hand discrimination task. 
Frequent playing of musical instruments involving precise finger 
coordination was additionally included as a dichotomic factor in a 
mixed model analysis. Neither the main, nor any of the interaction 
effects reached statistical significance. Training in finger 
coordination had no significant effect on the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Mean and standard error (SE) across subjects of median reaction times and d’ 
for experiment 1 of study 1. 
task posture 
reaction times (ms) d’ 
mean SE mean SE 
hand vertical 851 69 3.46 .23 
hand woven 1043 103 2.92 .24 
finger vertical 1174 65 2.12 .30 
finger woven 1209 110 2.10 .32 
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Exploratory analysis Every trial involved the simultaneous 
stimulation of two fingers. In consideration of four possible 
stimulation sites, this results in six possible combinations (Figure 3). 
During each task, two of these combinations served as targets and 
required a ‘same’ response, while the other four were distractors 
demanding a ‘different’ response. For example, during hand 
discrimination, the first two combinations in Figure 3 were targets 
 
Figure 3 Six possible 
stimulus combinations 
(rows) and stimulation 
categories (curly braces) 
used in experiment 1 of 
study 1 during the 
vertical and the woven 
posture (columns). 
Stimulation sites are 
indicated by circles. 
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(same hand), while all other combinations were distractors (different 
hands). The last two combinations in Figure 3 were distractors in 
both tasks. According to these properties, each pair of associated 
combinations can be subsumed to a particular stimulation category 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 4 Median reaction 
times (left column) and 
error rates (right column) 
during hand (H) and 
finger (F) discrimination 
in experiment 1 of study 
1, separated for the three 
stimulation categories 
(rows). Note that error 
rates are calculated and 
depicted as percentage 
values instead of d’. Error 
bars show standard error 
across subjects. 
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To account for the fact that these stimulation categories differ 
from each other in a crucial way (see discussion of experiment 1), 
the data was analyzed separately for each category. 
Figure 4 shows the influence of posture on reaction times and 
error rates in the hand and the finger discrimination task, separated 
for the three stimulation categories. At this level of aggregation, 
error rates could not be calculated according to SDT, as each 
stimulation category exclusively consists of either targets or 
distractors with respect to each task and so correct responses are 
predefined. During finger discrimination, the stimulation category 
‘same hand’ cannot produce true positives, because the stimulus 
combinations in this category are predefined as distractors. Figure 4 
therefore depicts the mean percentages of errors. 
In the end, descriptive analysis at this level of aggregation shows 
that the finger discrimination task was indeed affected by the 
postural conditions. The direction of this effect, however, varied for 
the different stimulation categories. Better performance during the 
woven as compared to the vertical posture was found for the 
categories ‘same finger’ and ‘different hand/finger’, while for the 
category ‘same hand’ this pattern was reversed. In contrast, the effect 
on hand discrimination did not differ between the stimulation 
categories, constantly resulting in a better performance during the 
vertical posture. The effect of stimulation category on the direction 
of the postural effect was entirely restricted to the finger 
discrimination task. 
To ascertain statistical significance for these findings, we 
analyzed the data separately for the three stimulation categories, 
focusing on the main effect of posture and its interaction with task 
type. With respect to reaction times, the main effect of posture 
reached significance only in the category ‘same hand’ (F1,30=24.3, 
p<.001) and was not significant in the others (same finger: F1,30=1.5, 
p=.233; different hand/finger: F1,30=0.2, p>.5), whereas the 
interaction effect showed the reversed pattern (same hand: F1,30=0.6, 
p=.45; same finger: F1,30=12.0, p=.002; different hand/finger: 
F1,30=7.7, p=.009). This characteristic significance pattern further 
confirms the conclusion that there is an influence of posture on 
finger discrimination, the direction of which is modulated by the 
stimulation categories. 
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Effects on error rates were statistically not significant, but the 
trends reflect the pattern obtained for reaction times (Figure 4), thus 
ruling out the possibility of speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
2.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 1 
At the highest level of data aggregation, no postural effect on 
finger discrimination was found. Rearranging the hands from the 
vertical to the woven posture seems to have no influence on the 
processing of fingers, neither a facilitating nor an inhibiting one. But 
this interpretation of our data is too superficial and does not account 
for the fact that the stimulus combinations used in the discrimination 
tasks have very distinct characteristics, which are of essential 
importance concerning their perception. The stimulation categories 
differ in the degree to which they require finger discrimination to 
gain a correct answer during the finger discrimination task. The 
crucial importance of this difference becomes obvious when the 
following considerations concerning the nature of hand and finger 
processing are taken into account. 
Overall shorter reaction times in the hand discrimination task 
suggest that the participants are faster in discriminating the hands 
than they are in discriminating the fingers. Constantly shorter 
reaction times for hand than for finger identification have also been 
reported by Haggard et al. (2006). This general advantage for hand 
processing might reflect the larger familiarity of hand distinction in 
everyday life. A recent study revealed different processing strategies 
for tactile stimuli at the fingers of the same vs. different hands 
(Overvliet, Smeets, & Brenner, 2010). Two stimuli at the same hand 
are processed in a serial manner, while stimuli applied to different 
hands are processed in parallel. Therefore, overall shorter reaction 
times in the hand discrimination task may be explained by the 
assumption that the process of hand discrimination occurs prior to 
the processing of fingers, and might even be completed, before 
finger discrimination starts. 
On this basis it seems quite reasonable that a task, which can be 
solved via hand discrimination alone, will be solved this way, even if 
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the task description appears to require finger discrimination. Of 
course, this is true for the hand discrimination task, which, by 
definition, requires discrimination of the hands. However, also the 
finger discrimination task, which is supposed to be performed via 
finger discrimination, can sometimes be solved solely on the basis of 
hand discrimination: when both tactile stimuli are perceived at the 
same hand, they must have appeared at different fingers. Only when 
the stimulus combination involves both hands, discrimination of 
fingers is inevitable. 
This applies to the stimulation categories ‘same finger’ and 
‘different hand/finger’ and, as shown in Figure 4, these are exactly 
the cases in which the finger discrimination task exhibits the 
postulated advantage in the woven posture. Only the stimulation 
category ‘same hand’, which can be solved via hand discrimination 
alone and therefore does not require any finger discrimination, 
reveals the reversed direction of the postural effect. 
Characteristically, this is exactly the profile we would expect for the 
hand discrimination task. 
Obviously, the absence of a postural effect on finger 
discrimination at a higher level of aggregation is caused by the 
interference of these complementary effects. In contrast, regarding 
the hand discrimination task, the effect of postural conditions has the 
same direction in every stimulation category, always producing 
shorter reaction times and error rates in the vertical posture. Due to 
the consistency in effect direction, the postural influence on hand 
discrimination can also be found when all stimulation categories are 
pooled. 
In summary, when finger discrimination was absolutely essential 
to solve the task and the discrimination of hands provided no 
information whatsoever about the correct answer, enhanced 
performance was found in the woven posture. This perceptual 
advantage for the finger discrimination task when fingers are 
interwoven is in line with our initial predictions, and demonstrates an 
influence of body posture on tactile discrimination of fingers. 
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2.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted in order to support our 
interpretation of the results from experiment 1, namely that tactile 
processing of fingers is influenced by a postural representation of the 
body. 
We implemented identification tasks rather than discrimination 
tasks. Participants were asked to identify the laterality of the touched 
hand, in the hand identification task, and the type of the touched 
finger, in the finger identification task, respectively. As in 
experiment 1, stimulation sites were restricted to the index and 
middle fingers of both hands. Two tactile stimuli were presented 
simultaneously to the fingertips of the participants. In the hand 
identification task, stimulation always involved both fingers of the 
same hand (i.e., the two stimulus combinations from the category 
‘same hand’), and in the finger identification task, stimuli always 
were applied to both fingers of the same type (i.e., stimulus 
combinations from the category ‘same finger’) (Figure 3). Both tasks 
were performed in the vertical and the woven posture (Figure 1a). 
The essential difference between the identification tasks 
implemented here and in Haggard et al. (2006, exp. 4) consists in the 
fact, that single stimuli were used in the latter, while in the present 
study both related fingers (as determined by task demands) were 
touched simultaneously. This implicates an important consequence 
for the information value of supplemental hand identification during 
the finger identification task: since in each trial both fingers of the 
same type were stimulated, supplemental hand identification was not 
only irrelevant for the correct response, but also did not provide any 
additional task-irrelevant information concerning the location of the 
stimuli in peripersonal space. 
As in experiment 1 and contrary to the experiments of Haggard et 
al. (2006), only the index and middle fingers were arranged 
according to the postural conditions (Figure 1a). Due to this 
modification, the spatial distance between the four relevant fingers is 
equal for both postural conditions (see description of experiment 1). 
Our hypotheses were exactly the same as in experiment 1. For 
hand identification, reaction times and error rates should be smaller 
during the vertical as compared to the woven posture. For the finger 
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identification task, we expected shorter reaction times and fewer 
errors during the woven as compared to the vertical posture. 
2.3.1 Methods 
Participants 16 healthy subjects, five of whom had already taken 
part in experiment 1, participated in experiment 2. They were 
recruited from the University of Mannheim and the local community, 
and were either paid or compensated with course credits. Data from 
two participants was excluded from further analysis due to extremely 
slow responses. Mean age of the remaining fourteen participants (7 
males) was 24.1, with a range from 20 to 30. According to the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), ten were right-
handed, three were left-handed and one was ambidextrous. All gave 
written informed consent previous to the experiment. 
As in experiment 1 we assessed past injuries at hands and fingers 
as well as activities providing frequent exercise regarding finger 
coordination (e.g., playing musical instruments). These factors had 
no influence on the results presented here. 
 
Experimental set-up In the finger identification task, denotation 
of the foot pedals was randomized across subjects. In order to avoid 
confusion concerning the labels ‘left’ and ‘right’, this randomization 
was abandoned in the hand identification task. Visual reminders on 
the occluding screen were changed by the experimenter according to 
the current task. ‘Left/right’ labels were used for the hand 
identification task and ‘index/middle’ labels for the finger 
identification task, respectively. Each block consisted of 30 single 
trials, so each of the two corresponding stimulus combinations was 
applied 15 times in randomized order. 
All other aspects of the experimental procedure were equal to 
those of experiment 1. 
 
Statistical analysis The cut-off time for reaction times was set to 
2000ms, which seems adequate for identification tasks since only 
0.17% of all trials were lost due to longer reaction times, and a cut-
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off time of two seconds was also used for motor responses by 
Haggard et al. (2006, exp. 4). Calculation of reaction times was 
based on correct trials only (98% of valid trials). 
A deviation from the statistical analysis of experiment 1 consists 
in the calculation of error rates. Again, SDT was applied to the data, 
but since there is no basis for the classification of the two response 
alternatives into targets and distractors, the data was analyzed 
according to a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) design, which 
involves the downward adjustment of d’ by a factor of 1/(sqrt 2) 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). 
2.3.2 Results 
Again, task type and postural conditions both constituted single 
factors of a 2x2 factorial design. Means and standard errors (SE) of 
median reaction times and error rates (d’) for each condition are 
shown in Table 2. Regarding the reaction times, mixed model 
analysis revealed a strong main effect of task type (F1,39=73.5, 
p<.001), but neither the main effect of posture (F1,39=0.9, p=.351) 
nor the interaction effect of task and posture (F1,39=2.6, p=.115) 
reached a significant level. Since the discrepancy in reaction times 
between the postural conditions was higher during the hand 
identification task, and even the trend of a postural effect on finger 
identification was of the opposite direction (Table 2 and Figure 5), a 
possible influence on hand identification alone could have been 
masked by the unaffected finger identification task. To account for 
this possibility, both tasks were analyzed separately. Supplemental t-
tests for paired samples showed a significant effect of posture during 
the hand identification task (t13=-2.8, p=.008, one-tailed), while no 
differences in reaction times could be observed for the finger 
identification task (t13=0.4, p=.333, one-tailed). 
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Table 2 Mean and standard error (SE) across subjects of median reaction times and d’ 
for experiment 2 of study 1. 
task posture 
reaction times (ms) d’ 
mean SE mean SE 
hand vertical 362 14 2.63 .03 
hand woven 393 19 2.55 .05 
finger vertical 486 26 2.20 .08 
finger woven 478 25 2.40 .09 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of error rates revealed a different pattern of results 
(Figure 5). Again, there was a significant main effect of task type 
(F1,39=23.0, p<.001), whereas the main effect of posture remained 
non-significant (F1,39=0.9, p=.359). The interaction effect of task 
 
Figure 5 Median reaction times and error rates (d’) during hand (H) and finger 
(F) identification in experiment 2 of study 1. Note that higher values of d’ 
indicate fewer errors. Error bars show standard error across subjects. 
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type and posture (F1,39=5.3, p=.026) reached significance as well, 
indicating a different effect of posture on both tasks. When analyzed 
separately for each task using paired t-tests, significant differences 
between the postural conditions could only be confirmed for the 
finger identification task (t13=-2.1, p=.029, one-tailed), but not for 
the hand identification task (t13=1.4, p=.092, one-tailed). However, it 
should be pointed out here that in the hand identification task, errors 
were extremely rare (less than 1% of all trials), which could have 
concealed an effect of posture. 
2.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted to confirm the hypothesis that 
finger identification depends on a postural representation of the 
fingers, as it has already been shown for the hands. By stimulating 
both fingers of the same type rather than just one, we tried to 
suppress implicit hand processing during the finger identification 
task. Since every trial involves the stimulation of both hands, 
supplemental processing of the associated hand provides no 
incremental information about the location of the stimuli in 
peripersonal space. 
We focused on two different performance measures, namely 
reaction times and error rates. In the finger identification task, 
postural conditions had no effect on reaction times, while 
significantly fewer errors were observed during the woven as 
compared to the vertical posture. Thus, the hypothesis of faster 
responses during the woven posture was disproved by the data, but 
the assumption of fewer errors during the same condition was 
confirmed. In the hand identification task, the reversed pattern was 
observed: while the participants did respond to the stimuli 
significantly faster during the vertical condition, error rates were 
equal for both postures. 
Both reaction times and error rates are equally important 
regarding performance, because they are directly related to each 
other. In speed tasks, fewer errors within the same time are 
comparable to faster responses accompanied by the same number of 
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errors. Experiment 2, therefore, confirms our initial assumption of a 
postural influence on both hand and finger identification. 
A direct comparison with the results of Haggard et al. (2006) 
revealed another interesting detail: while the overall reaction times, 
aggregated over the postural conditions, during hand identification 
are approximately equal in both studies (377 ms here and about 370 
ms in Haggard et al., 2006, exp. 4), there is a considerable difference 
in the overall reaction times during finger identification (482 ms here 
vs. about 700 ms). Thus, the differences between the identification 
tasks implemented in the two studies seem to selectively affect 
overall reaction times in the finger identification task. Apparently, 
this task can be solved faster when both fingers of a respective type 
are stimulated simultaneously. This supports our initial assumption 
that the finger identification task, as it was implemented by Haggard 
et al. (2006), implicitly involved supplemental hand processing. In 
our version of the task, supplemental hand identification was 
ineffectual to localize the stimuli in peripersonal space. Therefore, it 
was omitted, which in turn led to faster responses. 
The possibility that shorter reaction times during the finger 
identification task in the present experiment were solely caused by 
the acceptance of more errors is disproved by the fact that the present 
implementation of the identification tasks even produced fewer 
errors. 
2.4 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to provide evidence for the 
tactile processing of body parts within a spatial frame of reference. 
Based on considerations about the mental segmentation of 
peripersonal space, we expected hand and finger processing to be 
conversely affected by two postural conditions. In the vertical 
posture, index finger and middle finger of the right hand were placed 
above those of the left hand, and in the woven posture, index and 
middle fingers of both hands were interleaved (Figure 1a). Hand 
processing should be facilitated during the vertical and finger 
processing during the woven posture. 
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These hypotheses conflict with the results of Haggard et al. 
(2006), who applied single tactile stimuli to the fingertips of their 
participants and asked them to identify the touched hand or the 
touched finger type, respectively, during a vertical and a woven 
posture. A perceptual advantage for hand identification during the 
vertical posture was found, but finger identification was unaffected 
by the postural conditions. The authors’ interpretation was that 
fingers cannot be processed within an external frame of reference. 
However, this interpretation does not account for the differential 
information value of hand and finger processing (see Introduction). 
Mere finger identification is insufficient in order to localize a single 
tactile stimulus within an external frame of reference, because its 
location might differ highly, depending on the laterality of the 
stimulated hand. When touched at a specific finger, humans might 
automatically process the laterality of the associated hand, even 
when it is irrelevant for the correct response. These considerations 
suggest an alternative explanation of the results: the finger 
identification task, as it was implemented by Haggard et al. (2006), 
might have elicited an implicit processing of the laterality of the 
associated hand. This would confound two processes, namely finger 
and hand identification, which we assume to be conversely affected 
by the postural conditions. Thus, a postural effect on the finger 
identification task might have been concealed by the overlap of two 
opposed effects. 
To investigate the processing of fingers within an external frame 
of reference, it is of fundamental importance to implement a finger 
task which is unlikely to cause an implicit processing of the hands. 
However, the task’s theoretical independence of hand laterality is not 
sufficient for this purpose. It must rather be reliably ruled out that 
supplemental hand processing could be of any informative value 
concerning the location of the stimulated finger. 
In experiment 1, this was achieved by implementing 
discrimination tasks rather than identification tasks. Supplemental 
hand processing during the finger discrimination task provided no 
incremental spatial information, since targets involved the 
stimulation of both hands anyway. In experiment 2, we implemented 
identification tasks and eliminated supplemental hand processing 
during the finger task by simultaneously stimulating both fingers of 
the same type. As every trial involved the stimulation of both hands, 
identification of the associated hands became entirely meaningless 
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and provided no spatial information at all. Substantially higher 
reaction times were found for the discrimination tasks as compared 
to the identification tasks (see Table 1 and 2), suggesting different 
underlying mechanisms (Haggard et al., 2006). However, these are 
irrelevant for the conclusions drawn here, since the purpose of study 
1 was not to investigate the underlying mechanisms of 
discrimination and identification tasks, but postural effects on hand 
and finger processing within these tasks. 
Separate analysis of the stimulation categories in experiment 1 
revealed a strong postural influence on finger discrimination, with 
faster responses during the woven posture. Only when hand 
discrimination alone provided enough information for reliable 
judgements, the influence of the postural conditions was reversed, 
favoring the vertical posture. The same postural influence was found 
for the finger identification task in experiment 2, where participants 
made fewer errors when their fingers were interleaved. Compared to 
the results by Haggard et al. (2006), overall reaction times were 
reduced selectively during finger identification, confirming 
assumption that an additional process occurred when only one finger 
was stimulated. Regarding hand processing, a perceptual advantage 
of the vertical posture was found in both experiments, indicating the 
basic coherence to the study of Haggard et al. (2006). 
Taken together, our results are incompatible with the assumption 
of a mere somatotopic representation of the fingers. Influences of 
body posture on finger discrimination and finger identification have 
consistently been found in the experiments described here. As it has 
been shown for the hands (Haggard et al., 2006; Schicke & Röder, 
2006; Shenton, Schwoebel, & Coslett, 2004; Shore et al., 2002), 
processing of the fingers is modulated by their posture in 
peripersonal space. 
 
In both experiments of study 1, a perceptual advantage for finger 
processing was found during the woven posture, while hand 
processing was facilitated during the vertical posture. These 
directions of the postural effects are consistent with our initial 
predictions based on considerations about the mental segmentation 
of peripersonal space. Generally speaking, performance always was 
enhanced when the fingers were grouped according to the relevant 
dimension, i.e., laterality of the associated hand in the hand tasks and 
finger type in the finger tasks. In accordance with our results, we 
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propose that the spatial distance between related and unrelated 
fingers (as determined by task requirements) constitutes the basis for 
a mental segmentation of peripersonal space into task-relevant 
subdivisions. This segmentation of peripersonal space facilitates the 
association between tactile stimuli, localized within external 
coordinates, and specific body parts, currently occupying the same 
spatial area. Assigning a tactile stimulus to the touched body part 
(within an external reference system) only requires the distinction of 
discrete spatial areas and the localization of the stimulus within one 
of these areas. In a given task, each of these spatial fields is 
associated with a specific response. Therefore we will refer to them 
as response fields, which we define as task-relevant subdivisions of 
peripersonal space, representing a specific response alternative. 
If semantically linked response fields, i.e., representing the same 
response alternative, are spatially close to each other and not 
separated by response fields representing a different response 
alternative, they can be considered as being grouped, according to 
general grouping principles like proximity and shared features. 
Gestalt principles within the somatosensory domain (Gallace & 
Spence, 2011; Serino, Giovagnoli, de Vignemont, & Haggard, 2008). 
The configuration of response fields depends on body posture 
and task requirements. These factors were systematically 
manipulated in the present study. With respect to the hand tasks, 
related fingers were grouped during the vertical posture, thereby 
constituting two relatively large response fields. In the woven 
posture, each response alternative (i.e., each hand) was represented 
by two smaller response fields rather than a single one. For the finger 
tasks, this relation was reversed, because here it was the woven 
posture in which each response alternative was represented by one 
single response field, whereas the vertical posture revealed two 
response fields for each response alternative (Figure 1b). 
We assume that cognitive load increases with the number of 
response fields that have to be attended to simultaneously and with 
the degree to which different response fields are distinguishable from 
each other. Well discriminable response fields should be large, 
spatially distant and of limited number. 
Throughout study 1, the directions of the postural effects on both 
the hand and the finger tasks were in accordance with the 
conceptualization of response fields. In both experiments, we found 
a perceptual advantage for hand processing during the vertical 
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posture and for finger processing during the woven posture. The 
mental segmentation of peripersonal space into response fields seems 
to be a basic principle for the assignment of tactile stimuli to body 
parts within an external frame of reference. The configuration of 
response fields and its dependency on experimental variations of 
body posture and task requirements should be considered in future 
investigations on tactile processing of body parts within an external 
reference system. 
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3 Study 2: Testing Response Fields in 
Peripersonal Space 
The results of study 1 suggested that tactile identification of body 
parts within an external frame of reference depends on an association 
between the external coordinates of tactile stimuli and spatially 
related body parts. Dynamic qualities of spatial representations 
suggest that this association might be strengthened by a mental 
segmentation of peripersonal space into response fields, depending 
on a postural representation of the body. 
In three experiments we investigated the influence of size, 
number and relative distance between response fields on tactile hand 
identification. Healthy subjects received single tactile stimuli at their 
fingertips and were asked for speeded responses regarding the 
laterality of the stimulated hand. The task was performed under 
different hand postures, modulating the number, the size and the 
distance between response fields. The results show that reaction 
times are affected by the spatial distance between response fields 
(experiment 1), but not by their number and size (experiment 2 and 
3). Based on these results, a modification of the concept of response 
fields is proposed. 
3.1 Introduction 
Tactile stimuli are localized within an external frame of reference 
(Azañón & Soto-Faraco, 2008; Head & Holmes, 1911; Heed, 
Backhaus, & Röder, 2012). The localization of touch within external 
spatial coordinates allows for rapid movements towards the origin of 
a tactile stimulus, e.g., a mosquito bite (Rosenbaum, Loukopoulos, 
Meulenbroek, Vaughan, & Engelbrecht, 1995). It has been shown 
that this automatically driven process affects the identification of 
stimulated body parts (study 1 of this thesis and Haggard et al., 
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2006). Although the determination of a touched body part can be 
solved on the basis of a somatotopic reference system (Penfield & 
Rasmussen, 1950), body posture has a significant impact on 
performance. In several studies, in which tactile stimuli were 
delivered to the fingertips, identification of hand laterality was 
impaired when the fingers of both hands were interleaved, compared 
to when both hands were separated in space (study 1 of this thesis, 
Haggard et al., 2006.; Zampini et al., 2005). 
A prerequisite for an external reference system consists in a 
representation of external space, which emerges from integrated 
multisensory information (Graziano & Gross, 1998; Holmes & 
Spence, 2004; Làdavas et al., 1998; Làdavas & Farnè, 2004). 
Especially peripersonal space, i.e., the space within reaching 
distance, is pertinent for an adequate interaction within the 
environment. Stimuli within reaching distance are processed 
differently than stimuli outside this spatial region (Iriki et al., 1996; 
Longo & Lourenco, 2006). 
The representation of peripersonal space is not static, but exhibits 
dynamic qualities (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Legrand et al., 2007; 
Làdavas & Farnè, 2004). In several studies it has been shown that 
manipulations of the reaching distance by using tools are capable of 
extending peripersonal space. Remote areas, previously represented 
as extrapersonal space (i.e., out of reach), became immediately 
relevant for potential actions, and thus were integrated in the 
representation of peripersonal space (Longo & Lourenco, 2006; 
Longo & Lourenco, 2007; Làdavas & Farnè, 2004). The converse 
effect, a contraction of peripersonal space, has also been reported 
(Lourenco & Longo, 2009). Evidence for the plasticity of spatial 
representions stems from electrophysiological studies with macaque 
monkeys (Iriki et al., 1996; Maravita & Iriki, 2004) and from 
behavioral studies with human subjects (Maravita et al., 2002; 
Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001). 
Not only are the boundaries of peripersonal space dynamic, but 
also the relative resolution of its parts. Some areas within 
peripersonal space are overrepresented with respect to others (Driver 
& Grossenbacher, 1996; Lloyd, 2007; Làdavas et al., 1998; Reed et 
al., 2006; Reed et al., 2010; Short & Ward, 2009; Whiteley et al., 
2008). For example, Reed et al. (2006) reported shorter reaction 
times to visual stimuli presented close to the hands than to the same 
stimuli presented further away from the hands (but still within 
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reaching distance). This finding was interpreted in terms of spatial 
attention. Areas directly surrounding the hands are more relevant for 
immediate actions than distant areas. In a recent study, even a 
difference between the space near the palm of the hand (relevant for 
immediate grabbing) and the back of the hand (relatively irrelevant) 
could be verified (Reed et al., 2010). Importantly, these dynamics in 
spatial representations occurred also when only proprioceptive 
information of the hand position was available, i.e., when the hand 
was hidden from view (Makin et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2006). 
Within an external frame of reference, tactile sensations are 
processed according to their external spatial coordinates, and the 
body parts currently occupying that space are identified within the 
same reference system (Azañón & Soto-Faraco, 2008; Holmes & 
Spence, 2004; Kitazawa, 2002; Shore et al., 2005). The dynamic 
qualities of the representation of peripersonal space form the basis 
for a potential mechanism to strengthen this association between the 
external coordinates of tactile stimuli and the spatially related body 
parts. For example, the tactile identification of hands is facilitated by 
a mental segmentation of peripersonal space into two distinct areas, 
each of which is occupied by one hand. In this situation, hand 
identification only requires the localization of the stimuli within one 
of these discrete spatial areas, rather than a supplemental assignment 
of the spatial area to the related hand. Based on these considerations, 
the concept of response fields was proposed in study 1. Response 
fields were defined as ‘task-relevant subdivisions of peripersonal 
space, representing a specific response alternative’ (see Discussion 
of study 1). 
The segmentation of peripersonal space into response fields 
depends both on task demands and body posture. When the task 
requires a distinction between the hands, the configuration and the 
number of response fields should differ depending on hand posture. 
An example for the ‘vertical’ and the ‘woven’ posture, which were 
used in study 1 and in Haggard et al. (2006) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
In the vertical posture, fingers are grouped according to the 
associated hand, and therefore all parts of each hand can be 
represented by a single response field. In the woven posture, 
however, the fingers of both hands are interleaved and peripersonal 
space cannot be segmented into two discrete spatial areas 
distinctively representing all parts of one hand. According to the 
previous conceptualization specified in study 1, in the woven posture 
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each response field is split into two smaller ones, which are 
separated by a response field representing the other hand (Figure 1). 
In study 1, participants received light tactile stimuli at the 
fingertips, while they were holding their hands in either the vertical 
or the woven posture, and they were asked to identify the laterality 
of the touched hand. Consistent with the conceptualization of 
response fields, a better performance for hand identification was 
found during the vertical as compared to the woven posture. 
Furthermore, when the participants were asked to identify the type of 
the touched finger (i.e., index or middle) and hand laterality was 
completely irrelevant, a perceptual advantage for the woven posture 
appeared (Figure 5). This finding is also in line with the 
conceptualization of response fields, because it is the woven posture, 
in which the fingers are grouped according to finger type, thereby 
allowing for the formation of two (rather than four) response fields 
(Figure 1b). 
A mental segmentation of peripersonal space into response fields 
would enhance the association between spatial areas and specific 
body parts, and an increase in the number of response fields that 
have to be attended to simultaneously therefore should increase the 
cognitive load and result in lower performance. Furthermore, the 
differentiation of response fields might be influenced by their size 
and their relative distance from each other. According to the 
previous conceptualization of response fields, well-discriminable 
response fields should be large, spatially distant and of limited 
number (see Discussion of study 1). 
The aim of study 2 was to investigate the impact of these three 
factors on the discriminability of response fields and to provide 
further evidence for the practicability of the concept in the scope of 
tactile perception within an external reference system. 
Three experiments on tactile hand identification were conducted, 
in which the relative distance, the number and the size of response 
fields were systematically varied. In all three experiments, tactile 
stimuli were applied to the fingertips and participants were asked to 
indicate the laterality of the stimulated hand. In experiment 1, the 
spatial distance between the hands was manipulated. Experiments 2 
and 3 focused on the influence of the number and the size of the 
response fields for each hand. 
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3.2 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was conducted to test the influence of spatial 
distance between response fields on the tactile identification of hand 
laterality. Single tactile stimuli were applied to the tips of index and 
middle fingers of both hands, while the participants arranged their 
hands according to one of two postural conditions. In the adjacent 
posture, the index and middle fingers of one hand were placed 
directly above the same fingers of the other hand. In the separated 
posture, the fingers of the upper hand were lifted vertically by 10 cm 
(Figure 6a). Participants were asked for speeded responses regarding 
the laterality of the touched hand. According to the concept of 
response fields and its postulated dependency on spatial distance, we 
expected shorter reaction times during the separated as compared to 
the adjacent posture. 
The middle finger of the upper hand and the index finger of the 
lower hand (in the following referred to as interior fingers) were 
closer to the respective other hand than it is the case for the middle 
finger of the lower hand and the index finger of the upper hand 
(referred to as exterior fingers) (Figure 6a). The spatial proximity to 
a conflictive response field should impair the allocation of the 
stimuli within the correct response field. We therefore hypothesized 
higher reaction times after stimulation of the interior fingers than 
after stimulation of the exterior fingers. Furthermore, the effect of 
relative finger position (stimulation of interior vs. exterior fingers) 
was expected to be more pronounced in the adjacent as compared to 
the separated posture. 
3.2.1 Methods 
Participants 19 healthy participants were recruited from the 
University of Mannheim and the local community. They were either 
paid or received course credit. The data of two participants were 
excluded from analysis because of extremely slow responses 
(reaction times were three standard deviations above the mean) and 
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dysfunctions of the technical set-up. Mean age of the remaining 17 
participants (7 males) was 26.6 years, and all but two were right-
handed (Oldfield, 1971). All participants gave written informed 
consent previous to the experiment. 
 
Experimental and statistical procedures Participants were 
seated comfortably at a desk, deprived from the view of their hands. 
Index and middle fingers of both hands were arranged according to 
the two postural conditions (see Figure 6a). The other fingers and the 
thumbs were held at the ipsilateral side. Contact between the hands 
was prevented. To ensure the comparability of hand posture between 
different subjects, a wooden framework with two horizontal sticks, 
separated by 10cm, was fixed on the desk. In the adjacent posture, 
participants held the fingers of one hand below and the fingers of the 
other hand above the lower stick. In the separated posture, the 
fingers of one hand were placed below the lower stick and the 
fingers of the other hand on top of the upper stick. The postural 
conditions are depicted in Figure 6a. Thus, the spatial distance 
between the stimulated fingers of both hands was exactly 4mm in the 
adjacent and 10cm in the separated posture. Direct skin contact 
between fingers of different hands was prevented in order to 
eliminate mechanical transmission of the stimuli. The vertical 
positions of the hands were randomized across participants. 
Tactile stimuli were delivered via miniature solenoids (RS 
Components, model 330-5213) that were attached to the fingertips 
with adhesive tape. A well-noticeable tactile sensation was induced 
by a pulse length of 20ms. During the experiment, participants wore 
active noise-cancelling headphones (Audio Technica ATH-ANC7, 
QuietPoint®), in order to reduce acoustic disturbance caused by the 
solenoids. Responses were given with foot pedals in a congruent 
manner, i.e., touches at the right hand were indicated by pressing the 
right pedal and touches at the left hand by pressing the left pedal. 
The sequence of the postural conditions was randomized across 
subjects. In both conditions, each of the four relevant fingers was 
stimulated ten times in randomized order. The intertrial interval 
varied randomly between three and five seconds. Stimulus sequences 
were controlled using Presentation v14.2 (Neurobehavioral Systems, 
Inc., CA, USA). Participants were urged to respond as fast as 
possible. 
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Figure 6 a) Postural conditions and corresponding response fields for 
experiment 1 of study 2. Dotted circles indicate response fields for the right 
hand. b) Results from experiment 1. Error bars show standard error across 
subjects. 
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Due to extremely few errors (0.4%), error rates were not 
statistically analyzed. Nevertheless, it was assured that speed-
accuracy tradeoffs can impossibly account for the results, because 
more errors concurred with higher reaction times. Erroneous trials 
and responses given later than two seconds after stimulation were 
discarded. Statistical analysis was based on median reaction times. 
Data were analyzed in R (Version 2.13.1). 
3.2.2 Results 
Results are presented in Figure 6b and Table 3. The data were 
analyzed according to a linear mixed-effects model including the 
factors posture (adjacent vs. separated) and relative finger position 
(interior vs. exterior fingers). Participants were specified as random 
factor. The main effect of posture (F1,48=8.36, p<.01) was significant, 
indicating that reaction times were shorter during the separated as 
compared to the adjacent posture (Figure 6b). Neither the main effect 
of relative finger position (F1,48=0.3, p>.5) nor the interaction 
between both factors (F1,48=2.22, p=.14) reached a significant level. 
The effect of relative finger position was expected to be more 
pronounced during the adjacent posture, a hypothesis which is 
further confirmed by the interactive trend in the mixed model 
analysis. Therefore, the effect of relative finger position was 
analyzed separately for both postural conditions. One-tailed t-tests 
for paired samples showed a significant effect of relative finger 
position during the adjacent posture (t16=2.54, p=.01) and no such 
effect during the separated posture (t16 =-1.11, p=.86). Thus, when 
the stimuli appeared spatially close to the conflictive response field 
(i.e., representing the other response alternative), reaction times 
increased significantly. 
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Table 3 Mean and standard error (SE) across subjects of median reaction times for 
experiment 1 of study 2. 
posture finger position reaction times (ms) 
mean SE 
adjacent interior 406 15 
adjacent exterior 397 16 
separated interior 386 14 
separated exterior 390 13 
 
 
3.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 clearly shows that reaction times in a simple hand 
identification task are dependent on the spatial distance between the 
stimulated fingers. In the separated posture, when fingers of different 
hands were separated by 10cm, reaction times were significantly 
shorter than in the adjacent posture, when fingers of different hands 
were adjacent (Figure 6a). The spatial distance between the fingers 
of the right and those of the left hand facilitated the distinction 
between the two corresponding response fields. 
This result extends previous findings of attentional interferences 
between task-relevant and task-irrelevant tactile stimuli (Driver & 
Grossenbacher, 1996; Pavani et al., 2000; Soto-Faraco et al., 2004). 
For example, Driver & Grossenbacher (1996) asked their 
participants to discriminate between two qualitatively different 
tactile stimuli applied to their right hand, while ignoring similar 
stimuli presented simultaneously to their left hand. Task-irrelevant 
and task-relevant stimuli were either congruent or incongruent. The 
effect of congruency (i.e., decreased performance for incongruent 
trials) was enhanced, when the irrelevant stimuli appeared spatially 
close to the attended stimuli (Driver & Grossenbacher, 1996). Many 
studies confirmed that the congruency effect depends on the distance 
of the stimuli in external space and not on the somatotopic distance 
of the stimulated body parts (Gallace, Soto-Faraco, Dalton, 
Kreukniet, & Spence, 2008; Pavani et al., 2000; Soto-Faraco et al., 
2004). 
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Furthermore, we found higher reaction times when the stimuli 
appeared adjacent to the response field representing the conflictive 
response. This effect was only found for the adjacent posture, 
because in the separated posture, no finger was adjacent to the 
conflictive response field and the spatial distance was at least 10cm 
(Figure 6a). This result particularly confirms the idea of response 
fields in peripersonal space, for the decreased performance after 
stimulation of the interior fingers can only be caused by the spatial 
pattern of the tactile stimuli. Neither the type of interior fingers 
(which was randomized) nor mechanical transmission of the stimuli 
from the touched finger to the other hand (which was eliminated) can 
account for the increase in reaction times. 
Overall, the results of experiment 1 show that (i) the spatial 
distance between the hands facilitates tactile hand identification and 
that (ii) the assignment of a tactile stimulus to the touched hand is 
impaired by the spatial proximity to the other hand. These results are 
consistent with the concept of response fields, which were 
characterized as alleviating tactile processing within an external 
reference system, when they are spatially distant from each other. 
3.3 Experiment 2 
In experiment 2 we investigated whether reaction times in a hand 
identification task are affected by the number and size of response 
fields, which are associated with a specific response alternative. As 
in experiment 1, single tactile stimuli were delivered to the tips of 
the index and middle fingers of both hands, and participants were 
asked to indicate the laterality of the touched hand as quickly as 
possible. The task was conducted under two postural conditions. In 
the right-enclosed posture, the right fingers were adjacent, only 
separated by a wooden stick (4mm) and surrounded by the fingers of 
the left hand. In the left-enclosed posture, this configuration was 
reversed: the left fingers were adjacent and surrounded by the right 
fingers. The postural conditions are depicted in Figure 7a. 
The previous conceptualization of response fields based on the 
results of study 1 involves the assumption that one response field, 
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representing a specific response alternative, can be split up into two 
smaller ones, when these are separated by another response field, 
representing a different response alternative (an example is 
illustrated in Figure 1b). According to this assumption, the number 
and size of response fields for the right and the left hand should 
differ depending on the postural conditions. The right hand is 
represented by one large response field in the right-enclosed posture 
and by two small response fields in the left-enclosed posture. This 
configuration is reversed for the left hand. We hypothesized that 
reaction times following the stimulation of the right hand are shorter 
in the right-enclosed as compared to the left-enclosed posture. In 
contrast, reaction times to stimuli at the left hand were expected to 
be shorter in the left-enclosed as compared to the right-enclosed 
posture. 
3.3.1 Methods 
Participants Experiment 2 was conducted subsequently to 
experiment 1, and performed by the same group of participants. All 
gave written informed consent. 
 
Experimental and statistical procedures In both postural 
conditions, the interior fingers were separated by the lower stick of 
the wooden framework described in experiment 1. In this vein, 
mechanical transmission between fingers of the same hand was 
eliminated. Apart from the postural conditions, the experimental set-
up was the same as in experiment 1. All technical details and 
procedures are described in the method section of experiment 1. 
Error rates were extremely low (0.8%) and not statistically 
analyzed. 
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Table 4 Mean and standard error (SE) across subjects of median reaction times for 
experiment 2 of study 2. 
touched hand posture reaction times (ms) 
  mean SE 
right right-enclosed 431 17 
right left-enclosed 443 18 
left right-enclosed 442 12 
left left-enclosed 447 16 
 
3.3.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 7b and Table 4. The data were 
analyzed with a linear mixed effects model (2x2 factorial design). 
The two factors were constituted by the laterality of the stimulated 
hand and the two postural conditions. Subjects were included as 
random factor. According to our hypothesis, the interaction between 
the stimulated hand and the postural conditions was of major 
interest. However, no interaction between these factors was found 
(F1,48=0.13, p>.5). Neither the main effect of posture (F1,48=0.85, 
p=.36) nor the main effect of stimulated hand (F1,48=0.6, p=.44) were 
statistically significant. 
When analyzed separately using paired t-tests, no significant 
effects were found for the right hand (t16=1.04, p=.16) and for the 
left hand (t16=-0.35, p>.5). Regarding the detection of the left hand, 
marginal effects were even directed contrary to our hypotheses 
(Figure 7b). 
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Figure 7 a) Postural conditions and corresponding response fields for 
experiment 2 and 3 of study 2, according to the previous 
conceptualization of response fields. Dotted circles indicate response 
fields for the right hand. b) Results from experiment 2 and c) 
experiment 3. Error bars show standard error across subjects. 
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3.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 2 
In experiment 2, we expected shorter reaction times when both 
fingers of the stimulated hand were adjacent rather than separated by 
fingers belonging to the other hand, as it was the case in the right-
enclosed posture for the right and in the left-enclosed posture for the 
left hand (Figure 7a). This hypothesis was drawn from the 
assumption that the number and size of response fields for each hand 
is modulated by these postural conditions. However, the results did 
not reveal any effects of posture, and a modulating influence of the 
number or the size of response fields on reaction times could not be 
confirmed. During both postures and with respect to both hands, 
reaction times were approximately equal and did not differ 
substantially. Contrary to our hypotheses, reaction times after 
stimulation of the left hand were even higher in the left-enclosed as 
compared to the right-enclosed posture. In experiment 2, no 
influence of number and size of response fields on the performance 
in the hand identification task could be verified. 
However, retrospective considerations indicated that the absence 
of postural effects might as well be accounted for by the design of 
the implemented task. Participants were instructed to react to the 
stimulation of both the right and the left hand. This was possible 
only when the participants’ attention was divided between the 
response fields of the right and those of the left hand, because the 
stimuli could occur within both (the order of stimulation was 
randomized). As a consequence, there were always three response 
fields, which had to be attended simultaneously, regardless of the 
postural condition. Although the meaning of the response fields 
changed with posture, their total number and size remained constant. 
This possible explanation for the absence of postural effects in 
experiment 2 was specifically tested in experiment 3. 
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3.4 Experiment 3 
To ensure that attending the response fields of only one hand was 
sufficient to solve the identification tasks, participants in experiment 
3 reacted only to stimuli at one specific hand. Single tactile stimuli 
were applied to the index and middle fingers of both hands, which 
were held either in the right-enclosed or in the left-enclosed posture 
(Figure 7a). An additional factor was constituted by the attended 
hand. In the right hand task, participants were instructed to react only 
to stimuli at their right hand and to ignore those at their left hand, 
and vice versa in the left hand task. Due to this modification of 
experiment 2, attended response fields differed between the postural 
conditions, depending on the laterality of the attended hand. For the 
right hand task, the right-enclosed posture should result in one large 
response field and the left-enclosed posture in two small ones. For 
the left hand task, this configuration should be reversed. It was 
hypothesized that reaction times in the right hand task were shorter 
in the right-enclosed as compared to the left-enclosed posture. For 
the left hand task, shorter reaction times were expected in the left-
enclosed as compared to the right-enclosed posture. 
3.4.1 Methods 
Participants 19 healthy students (8 males, mean age was 25.3 
years) from the University of Mannheim, seven of which also took 
part in experiment 1 and 2, participated in experiment 3. All but 
three were right-handed and one was ambidextrous (Oldfield, 1971). 
All gave written informed consent to the experiment. 
 
Experimental and statistical procedures The order of tasks 
(i.e., whether the right or the left hand should be attended) was 
randomized across subjects. To reduce confusion concerning the 
instructions, the order of the postural conditions was randomized 
only within the tasks. Speeded responses were given with the foot 
ipsilateral to the attended hand. 
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The experimental set-up was the same as in experiment 1 and 2. 
The postural conditions are described in experiment 2 and in Figure 
7a and all technical details and procedures in the method section of 
experiment 1. 
3.4.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 7c and Table 5. Data were analyzed 
with a linear mixed effects model (2x2 factorial design), containing 
the factors attended hand and postural condition. Neither the 
interaction effect (F1,54=0.24, p>.5), which was of major interest, nor 
one of the main effects (attended hand: F1,54=1.63, p=.21; posture: 
F1,54=1.85, p=.18) reached a significant level. Separate t-tests 
revealed no significant effect for the right hand (t18=0.78, p=.22) and 
neither for the left hand (t18=-1.14, p>.5). 
During both postural conditions, stimulation of the right hand 
resulted in slightly shorter reaction times than stimulation of the left 
hand (Figure 7c), a trend that has also been found in experiment 2 
(Figure 7b). This marginal difference can be explained by faster 
reactions to stimuli at the dominant hand (and with the dominant 
foot), since most participants in experiment 2 and 3 were right-
handed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Mean and standard error (SE) across subjects of median reaction times for 
experiment 3 of study 2. 
attended hand posture reaction times (ms) 
  mean SE 
right right-enclosed 472 18 
right left-enclosed 480 15 
left right-enclosed 480 18 
left left-enclosed 498 19 
 
Study 2 63 
3.4.3 Discussion of Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to eliminate the need for divided 
attention between both hands, a factor that might have concealed an 
influence of the postural conditions in experiment 2. In the right-
enclosed posture, there was supposed to be one large response field 
for the right hand and two small ones for the left hand, and vice 
versa in the left-enclosed posture. Consequently, when the 
participants’ attention is divided between both hands, three response 
fields would have to be attended, regardless of the postural 
conditions. In experiment 3, participants were instructed to react 
only to stimuli at one specific hand and to ignore those occurring at 
the other hand. Due to this modification, only the response fields for 
one hand would have to be attended, rather than the sum of response 
fields for both hands. 
Despite this modulation, experiment 3 revealed the same results 
as were obtained in experiment 2. No influence of the postural 
conditions on reaction times was found, neither regarding 
identification of the right hand nor identification of the left hand. An 
effect of the number and the size of response fields on reaction times 
in hand identification could not be verified, even when the 
participants’ attention was directed to one specific hand. In spite of 
null findings, these results absolutely disqualify the initial 
assumption that reaction times are affected by the size and the 
number of response fields, because not even a non-significant 
interaction effect in the expected direction was found. This result has 
important implications on the conceptualization of response fields 
and will be discussed in the next section. 
3.5 Discussion 
The present study was devoted to the dynamic qualities of the 
representation of peripersonal space and their influence on tactile 
identification of body parts. Specifically, we investigated the 
characteristics of response fields, which were defined as task-
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relevant subdivisions of peripersonal space, each representing a 
specific response alternative within a given task (study 1). Using an 
external reference system, a mental segmentation of peripersonal 
space into discrete spatial areas should facilitate the tactile 
identification of touched body parts, because it only requires the 
localization of tactile stimuli within one of these areas and an 
association of that area with a specific response. This mental 
segmentation of peripersonal space is enabled by the dynamic 
qualities of spatial representations (Holmes & Spence, 2004; 
Legrand et al., 2007; Longo & Lourenco, 2006; Reed et al., 2006; 
Reed et al., 2010). According to a previous conceptualization based 
on the results of study 1, response fields should be large, spatially 
distant and of limited number, to be maximally distinguishable from 
each other (see Discussion of study 1). 
In order to test the impact of these three factors on the tactile 
identification of body parts, three experiments were conducted. Each 
experiment consisted in a simple hand identification task, which was 
performed under different postural conditions. Single tactile stimuli 
were delivered to the index and middle fingers of both hands, and the 
participants were asked for speeded responses about the laterality of 
the touched hand. Experiment 1 was designed to investigate the 
influence of spatial distance between response fields (Figure 6). In 
experiment 2 and 3, the postural conditions were selected in order to 
manipulate the number and size of response fields (Figure 7). 
The results of experiment 1 show that reaction times in a simple 
hand identification task depend on the spatial distance between the 
external coordinates of the stimuli and the untouched hand. When 
the distance between hands is large, stimuli can be faster assigned to 
the associated hand. In contrast, when the untouched hand is 
spatially close to the location of the tactile stimulus, increased 
reaction times have been found. Importantly, this effect is not only 
mediated by the mere distance between the hands, but rather by the 
distance between the tactile stimuli and the hand, which had not been 
touched. For the adjacent posture, higher reaction times were found 
after stimulation of the interior as compared to the exterior fingers. 
This clearly indicates that, besides the effect of pure hand distance, 
reaction times were additionally affected by the spatial distance 
between tactile stimuli and conflictive response fields. 
In experiment 2, the number and the size of response fields had 
no significant influence on reaction times. The possibility that the 
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absence of an effect was caused by the requirement of dividing 
attention between both hands was ruled out by experiment 3, in 
which the participants were instructed to attend only to one specific 
hand. Results in experiments 2 and 3 consist entirely in the absence 
of effects, raising doubts about their appropriate interpretation. 
However, since detection of the left hand was even faster during the 
right-enclosed as compared to the left-enclosed posture (which was 
contrary to our predictions) and also the interaction between postural 
conditions and attended hand in experiment 3 was directed contrary 
to our hypotheses, the results clearly show that the postural 
conditions did not affect reaction times in the expected way. This 
finding contradicts the previous conceptualization of response fields. 
Taken together, the spatial distance between response fields and 
the spatial occurrence of tactile stimuli within these response fields 
had a significant impact on reaction times for tactile hand 
identification. Neither their number nor their size seems to have any 
effects on performance. The mental segmentation of peripersonal 
space into task-relevant subdivisions depends on the number of 
entities (here body parts), which have to be distinguished. A hand 
identification task implies two response alternatives, and therefore 
demands a spatial segmentation into at least two subdivisions. The 
number of response alternatives constitutes the minimum of required 
response fields. Assigning more than one spatial field to the same 
response alternative would naturally enhance the cognitive load, 
which should become manifest in increased reaction times. The 
results of experiment 2 and 3 therefore raise issues about the 
appropriateness of the first conceptualization of response fields 
described in study 1. In fact, experiments 2 and 3 of study 2 seem to 
indicate that the separation of two fingers of the same hand by 
fingers of the other hand does not result in a split-up of the 
associated response field. 
Based on the results of study 2, we propose a modification of the 
previous conceptualization of response fields by withdrawing the 
assumption that one response field can be split into several smaller 
ones (see Discussion of study 1). The consequences of this 
modification with respect to the configuration of response fields 
representing the hands are illustrated in Figure 8. To identify a 
touched body part within an external frame of reference, each 
response alternative is represented by exactly one response field in 
peripersonal space. Depending on body posture and task 
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requirements, these response fields can overlap each other. 
According to this modified conceptualization, the right-enclosed and 
the left-enclosed posture both result in two overlapping response 
fields (Figure 8a). The overlap of response fields is absolutely equal 
for both postural conditions and for both hands. Assuming that the 
overlap of conflictive response fields constitutes a relevant factor 
modulating their discriminability, an assumption which is affirmed 
by experiment 1, it is coherent that the postural conditions had no 
effect on performance in experiment 2 and 3. 
 
The results of experiments 2 and 3 suggest a modification, but do 
not call for a rejection of the concept of response fields, for its basic 
appropriateness is strongly supported by experiment 1, where 
reaction times were affected by the spatial distance between the 
stimulated fingers of different hands. Specifically the finding of 
 
Figure 8 Comparison of a) the previous and b) the modified conceptualization 
of response fields on the basis of the postural conditions used in experiment 2 
and 3 of study 2 (right-enclosed and left-enclosed) and the postural conditions 
used in study 1 and in Haggard et al. (2006) (vertical and woven). According to 
the previous version (a), response fields for each hand differ in their number 
and size for the right-enclosed as compared to the left-enclosed and for the 
vertical as compared to the woven posture, predicting deviant performance for 
the first and the second pair of postures. According to the modified version (b), 
the overlap between response fields is equal for the right-enclosed and the left-
enclosed, but differs for the vertical and the woven posture, predicting equal 
performance for the first and deviant performance for the second pair of 
postures. 
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higher reaction times for the interior fingers (which were adjacent to 
a finger belonging to the other hand) than for the exterior fingers 
(which were more remote from the fingers of the other hand) in the 
adjacent posture demonstrates the existence of response fields. 
Tactile events are processed with respect to their external 
coordinates, and the reaction time needed to identify a stimulated 
body part depends on the spatial distance of the tactile stimulus from 
a non-stimulated body part (i.e., a spatial area representing a 
different response). The smaller the distance to a conflictive response 
field, the longer it takes to associate the stimulus with the correct 
response. It is of considerable importance here that the position of 
the hands itself does not change. The difference in reaction times 
cannot be accounted for by a variation of the distance between the 
hands themselves, but solely by the distance between the tactile 
stimulus and the untouched hand. This finding confirms the 
assumption of response fields and demonstrates the impact of the 
spatial distance between them. 
In a recent study investigating the spatial representation of 
fingers, Overvliet et al. (2011) asked their participants to localize 
light tactile stimuli at the fingertips. Participants were instructed 
either to spread their fingers or to hold them close together, thereby 
varying the spatial distance between the stimulation sites. 
Interestingly, the spatial distance between fingers had no influence 
on the amount of localization errors towards neighboring fingers. 
The spatial proximity of untouched fingers to the tactile stimuli did 
not result in more mislocalizations towards those fingers, which 
seems contradictive to what was found in experiment 1 of the present 
study. However, in the study by Overvliet et al. (2011) participants 
had as much time as necessary to respond, whereas our participants 
were asked for speeded responses. As indicated by several studies, 
speeded response tasks are based on action-related spatial 
representations such as the body schema (Gallagher, 2005; Rossetti, 
1998). Increased temporal delay between stimulus and response 
results in a cognitive evaluation of the response, and therefore 
reflects influences of the body image (Gallagher, 2005). Against this 
background, our results can be understood as reflecting the relevance 
of spatial distance for localization based on the body schema, while 
Overvliet et al. (2011) demonstrate that this relationship is 
diminished with respect to the body image. Differences between 
slow and speeded responses have been frequently reported in both 
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patient groups and healthy subjects (Goodale et al., 1994; Rossetti, 
Gaunet, & Thinus-Blanc, 1996; Rossetti, 1998). 
 
Apart from the results of study 1 and 2, the modified version of 
the concept of response fields is capable to explain a variety of 
results reported in previous studies (Driver & Grossenbacher, 1996; 
Gallace & Spence, 2005; Haggard et al., 2006; Lloyd, 2007; Soto-
Faraco et al., 2004). For example, it has been found in study 1 and in 
a study by Haggard et al. (2006) that performance in a tactile hand 
identification task decreases when the fingers of different hands are 
interleaved (woven posture) rather than grouped (vertical posture). 
Within the previous conceptualization of response fields this finding 
was explained by a split-up of response fields during the woven 
posture (Figure 8a). It is also compatible with the modified 
conceptualization, which states that the impairment during the 
woven posture is caused by an overlap of response fields for both 
hands (Figure 8b). A reversed effect of the vertical and the woven 
posture would be expected for the tactile identification of finger 
type, because regarding finger type it is the woven posture, in which 
the response fields are not overlapping. This dissociation between 
the postural conditions and task requirements could be confirmed in 
both experiments of study 1. 
In spite of identical task demands, task complexity and 
participants between experiment 1 and 2 (differences consisted only 
in the postural conditions), overall reaction times were substantially 
shorter in experiment 1 (395ms) as compared to experiments 2 
(441ms). This finding supports the assumption that the degree of 
overlap between response fields is the critical variable modulating 
their discriminability, because response fields were overlapping in 
experiment 2, but not in experiment 1 (Figure 8b). 
The modified conceptualization of response fields states that the 
association between tactile stimuli and specific body parts is 
facilitated by a mental segmentation of peripersonal space into task-
relevant subdivisions. These spatial areas constitute response fields, 
which are representing specific body parts and accordingly, in tactile 
identification tasks, specific response alternatives. Each response 
alternative is represented by exactly one response field, and the 
degree of overlap between them directly modulates the ability to 
associate a tactile stimulus with the touched body part. 
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4 Study 3: Ownership and Agency in the 
Rubber Hand Illusion 
It has been investigated to which extent external objects like 
artificial hands can be incorporated into body representations. 
However, most studies dedicated to the effects of volitional motor 
control over external objects dealt with projected or mirrored images 
of own body parts. 
Using the paradigm of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), we 
assessed the impact of passive tactile sensations and active volitional 
movements with respect to an artificial hand, which unambiguously 
was recognized as a body-extraneous object. In addition to 
phenomenal self-reports and motor responses, we introduced a new 
procedure for perceptual judgements enabling the assessment of 
proprioceptive drift and discrimination performance regarding 
perceived hand location. 
RHI effects were comparable for passive touch and active 
movements, but characteristic discrepancies were found for motor 
responses. Motor responses were differently affected by the 
induction methods and performance was uncorrelated between both 
methods. These observations shed new light on inconsistent results 
concerning RHI effects on motor responses. 
4.1 Introduction 
The human body can be considered as the interface between the 
phenomenal self and the external world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). 
The sensation of tactile events at the body and motor control over 
body parts are the constituents for the development of a bodily self, 
i.e., the feeling of ‘being’ or ‘having’ a body (Tsakiris et al., 2006). 
The sensation of tactile events is a predominantly passive process 
and results in a feeling of ownership over the body, whereas motor 
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control implies an act of volition, involving a strong intentional 
component, and additionally causes a sense of agency (Gallagher, 
2005; Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2007b). 
The aspect of tactile sensation has been thoroughly investigated 
using the rubber hand illusion (RHI). In the original version of this 
paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), an artificial hand is placed 
visibly and in an anatomically plausible position in front of the 
participant, whose own hand is hidden from view. The experimenter 
then strokes both the artificial and the real hand in a synchronous 
manner with two identical paint brushes, which results in 
multisensory conflict between visual and proprioceptive information 
about hand posture. The touch is felt at a location different from 
where it is seen, and in order to solve this conflict, the perceived 
location of the own hand is shifted towards the location of the 
artificial hand. This phenomenon is generally referred to as 
proprioceptive drift and has often been used as a measure for the 
degree of incorporation of body-extraneous objects and the 
subjective feeling of ownership over an artificial limb (Kammers et 
al., 2009a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
The described procedure is based on passive tactile stimulation 
and refers to just one aspect of the bodily self, namely body 
ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & 
Fink, 2007a). Only few studies implemented active motor control 
over finger movements of prosthetic hands to examine the sense of 
agency over body-extraneous objects (Azañón & Soto-Faraco, 2007; 
Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2012; Walsh, Moseley, Taylor, & Gandevia, 2011). Although several 
studies investigated the effect of displaced visual feedback regarding 
active finger movements, in nearly all of them visual feedback was 
presented either via video images of the real ipsilateral hand 
(Kammers et al., 2009b; Longo & Haggard, 2009; Newport et al., 
2010; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2010) or via mirror 
reflections of the real contralateral hand (Holmes, Crozier, & 
Spence, 2004; Holmes & Spence, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006). These 
methods raise fundamental issues concerning the incorporation of 
body-extraneous objects into own body representations, because, 
strictly speaking, participants actually are looking at their real hand, 
even if the visual information is spatially displaced (Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2012). The critical question arises, whether the 
incorporation of a visually displaced own hand relies on the same 
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mechanisms as the incorporation of an unambiguously body-
extraneous object (Bertamini, Berselli, Bode, Lawson, & Wong, 
2011; Ijsselsteijn et al., 2006). The high familiarity regarding video 
displays and mirrors suggests the involvement of top-down 
processes, which have been shown to enhance the susceptibility to 
the RHI (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Holmes et al., 2006; Pavani et al., 
2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).10 The implementation of active 
motor control over prosthetic hands, which unambiguously will be 
considered as body-extraneous, is highly relevant to determine the 
relevance of a sense of agency for the incorporation of external 
objects and the development of a bodily self (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2012). 
Body representations depend on their functional relevance 
(Gallagher, 2005; Head & Holmes, 1911). The sensory information 
forming the basis for perceptual judgements (e.g., about body 
posture) is represented differently from the information being used 
for motor purposes (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Kammers, van der 
Ham, & Dijkerman, 2006; Kammers et al., 2009a). Accordingly, the 
distinction between two types of body representations has been 
proposed, generally referred to as body schema and body image 
(Gallagher, 2005; Paillard, 1999). According to Gallagher’s (2005) 
thorough description, which is based on the original 
conceptualization by Head & Holmes (1911), the body schema is 
defined as an implicit reference frame for the guidance of 
movements, whereas the body image consists in conscious 
perceptions and attitudes towards ones own body. The dissociation 
between body schema and body image is supported by clinical case 
studies (Buxbaum & Coslett, 2001; Head & Holmes, 1911; Paillard, 
1999) as well as studies involving healthy participants (Cardinali et 
al., 2011; Kammers et al., 2006; Kammers et al., 2009a). 
An approved and commonly used method to investigate the 
differential effects on body image and body schema consists in 
                                                          
10
 In another series of studies, movable artificial hands were presented within a virtual 
reality environment (Raz, Weiss, & Reiner, 2008; Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, 
Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009). 
Although this method should diminish the influence of top-down effects, the 
familiarity regarding computer games still raises doubts about whether a virtual hand 
is perceived as an external object (in the same way as a material prosthetic hand). In 
spite of remarkable developments in virtual reality techniques, there are great 
differences between the neural processing of virtual as compared to material objects 
(Ijsselsteijn, de Kort, & Haans, 2006). 
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comparing the performance in perceptual and motor tasks (Cardinali 
et al., 2011; Kammers et al., 2006; Kammers et al., 2009a; Kammers 
et al., 2009b). This technique is derived from the assumption that 
perceptual judgements (e.g., verbal reports) rely on an intact body 
image, while motor responses (e.g., ballistic pointing movements) 
are based on body-schematic processes. With respect to the RHI, 
Kammers et al. (2009a; 2009b) found that perceptual judgements 
about hand posture were significantly biased towards the location of 
the artificial hand, while the accuracy of ballistic pointing 
movements towards the own hand was not impaired by the illusion. 
The authors concluded that the RHI involving passive tactile 
stimulation exclusively affects the body image (Kammers et al., 
2009a). 
However, the findings concerning the effects of the RHI on 
motor responses are inconsistent. Other studies did reveal significant 
effects on pointing and grasping movements, suggesting a distortion 
of the body schema (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Heed et al., 2011; 
Holmes et al., 2006; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Kammers, Kootker, 
Hogendoorn, & Dijkerman, 2010). These studies differ in many 
important aspects, which might explain the inconsistent results. First, 
in most studies the pointing targets were defined by visual rather 
than proprioceptive cues (e.g., Holmes et al., 2006; Kammers et al., 
2009b), i.e., participants pointed with the stimulated hand towards a 
visually defined location in their environment rather than towards a 
proprioceptively defined location on their body (e.g., their non-
stimulated hand, Kammers et al., 2009a). However, movements 
towards visual as compared to proprioceptively defined targets might 
be based on different mechanisms and different frames of reference. 
Second, some studies used passive tactile stimulation to induce the 
illusion (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Heed et al., 2011; Kammers 
et al., 2009a) and others implemented active voluntary finger 
movements of the artificial hand (e.g., Holmes et al., 2006.; Kalckert 
& Ehrsson, 2012). As pointed out by Kammers et al. (2009b), an 
induction method based on the sensory integration of motor 
commands, proprioception and visual feedback is more likely to 
interact with body-schematic representations (compared to an 
induction method based on the integration of tactile and visual 
information). Third and critically connected to the second point, the 
nature of the artificial hand varied across studies. As mentioned 
earlier, most studies implementing motor control over artificial 
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hands (and, with the exception of Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, all 
studies investigating its effect on motor responses) used video- or 
mirror-based versions of the RHI. To eliminate top-down processes 
caused by the high familiarity regarding video images and mirror 
reflections (Bertamini et al., 2011), the implementation of active 
motor control over prosthetic hands is of considerable importance. 
In study 3 we therefore implemented a new technique to induce 
the RHI, involving voluntary motor control over the finger 
movements of an artificial hand, which unambiguously was 
recognized as body-extraneous (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Effects 
were quantified by altered performance in a perceptual and a motor 
task, as well as phenomenal self-reports, and were directly compared 
to those of the original induction method based on passive tactile 
stimulation of the own and the artificial hand. 
4.2 Experiment 
4.2.1 Methods 
Participants 40 healthy participants (14 males; mean age was 
24.5 years) were recruited from the University of Mannheim and the 
local community. They were either paid or received course credit. 
All were right-handed, as assessed by the revised Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants gave written 
informed consent to the experiment. 
 
Experimental protocol The experimental set-up is depicted in 
Figure 9. The participants’ hands were placed in a wooden 
framework (125cm*50cm*25cm). Vision of the right hand was 
prevented by an occluding screen. An artificial right hand made of 
wood and containing flexible joints at the digits was placed visibly in 
front of the participants, 15cm to the left of their right hand 
(measured from the index fingers). A skin-colored rubber glove was 
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slipped over the wooden hand. Participants were instructed to adjust 
their body midline halfway between the wooden hand and their own 
left hand, which was placed 31cm to the left of the artificial hand 
(Figure 9a). The index finger of the wooden hand could be lifted via 
a pneumatically driven plunger, which was controlled by a capacitive 
sensor placed beneath the participants’ right index finger. The 
experimental set-up thus enabled the experience of agency over the 
index finger movements of the artificial hand. 
The experiment was composed of four experimental conditions 
(synchronous and asynchronous touch, synchronous and 
asynchronous movements), each involving an induction phase 
(3min), a motor task (approx. 10sec), a perceptual task (approx. 
2min) and an RHI questionnaire (approx. 1min). To exclude the 
possibility that perceptual responses were affected by the preceding 
motor responses, motor tasks were omitted for one third of all 
participants (N=13). No differences in the perceptual response were 
found depending on the presence or absence of a preceding motor 
response (see Results). The induction phases were specified by the 
method used to induce the RHI (passive vs. active) and the 
synchrony of associated stimuli (synchronous vs. asynchronous). 
The order of the experimental conditions was randomized across 
participants. Previous to the experimental conditions, a motor task (if 
included) and a perceptual task were performed as baseline measure. 
 
Induction methods In the method of passive touch, the artificial 
index finger was stroked in synchrony with the unseen real index 
finger, using two identical paint brushes. This method is based on the 
integration of somatosensory and visual information and reflects the 
original procedure for the induction of the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998). In the active induction method, participants were instructed to 
voluntarily lift their right index finger every 3 to 5 seconds, 
approximately. These volitional movements were accompanied by 
corresponding synchronous movements of the artificial hand, which 
should result in a sense of agency for the latter (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2012). This method is based on the integration of motor commands, 
proprioception and vision, and thus should be more likely to interact 
with the body representation that is related to action and movement, 
namely the body schema. 
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Both induction methods were performed in a synchronous and an 
asynchronous manner, in which a variable delay of 0.5 to 2 seconds 
was introduced between the respective events at the real and the 
artificial finger. 
 
 
Figure 9 Experimental set-up. During the a) induction phase, vision of the own 
right hand was prevented by an occluding screen and participants were 
instructed to watch the artificial hand. In the b) motor task, participants pointed 
with eyes closed towards the location of their right index finger. In the c) 
perceptual task, participants indicated whether a series of dots on a horizontally 
placed computer monitor appeared to the right or to the left of their right index 
finger. 
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Motor task After the induction phase, participants were 
instructed to close their eyes. A wooden board containing a touch-
sensitive area (26cm*17cm) was placed horizontally above their 
right hand (8cm above the table). When verbally prompted by the 
experimenter, participants moved their left (non-stimulated) index 
finger towards the position of their right index finger in a rapid, 
ballistic movement (Figure 9b). Once the board had been reached, no 
further corrections were allowed. Indicated locations were recorded 
by a camera (eSecure, USB 8MP 8 LED Webcam) fixed one meter 
above the participants’ right hand. One pointing movement was 
performed in each of the four experimental conditions11. Individual 
accuracy of pointing was quantified by the variance of ten pointing 
movements, executed during the baseline. Pointing movements were 
always performed with eyes closed and practiced prior to the 
experiment. 
Time points of movement initiations were recorded, enabling the 
calculation of movement times, which were used to control for the 
ballistic qualities of the pointing movements. Movement times 
deviating more than three standard deviations from the mean (i.e., 
higher than 609ms) were discarded. 
 
Perceptual task After the motor task (participants kept their eyes 
close), the touch-sensitive board was removed and a computer 
monitor (52cm*29.5cm, LG Electronics Flatron W2443T) was 
placed horizontally above the artificial and the real right hand, 
completely occluding them from sight (Figure 9c). Participants then 
were asked to open their eyes and to judge the positions of a series of 
red dots appearing for 100ms on the screen (white background). 
Specifically, they had to indicate for each single dot, whether it was 
located to the left or to the right of their own right index finger. Each 
dot (2mm*2mm) was presented at one of ten possible positions, 
which were interspaced by 1cm and arranged along the horizontal 
plane in the middle of the monitor. To minimize ceiling and floor 
effects, the relative positions of the dots to the real right index finger 
were adjusted for each individual on the basis of the baseline data. 
Nevertheless, the data of two participants had to be excluded from 
analysis, because in at least one condition all dots were perceived at 
the same side relative to their own right index finger. 
                                                          
11
 For one participant, the recording in the synchronous condition of the active 
induction method failed. 
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Participants were asked to which side the dot would have to 
move to be exactly over their own right index finger. Responses 
were given via a computer mouse with the left hand. Participants 
were urged to respond as fast as possible. Responses later than 1s or 
earlier than 200ms after the dot’s onset were discarded. The dots 
were presented ten times at each of the ten possible locations in 
randomized order, resulting in a total of 100 trials. The intertrial 
interval between the response and the appearance of the next dot was 
set to one second. Stimulus sequences were controlled using 
Presentation v14.2 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., CA, USA). 
 
Phenomenal self-reports After the perceptual task, the monitor 
was removed and participants completed an RHI questionnaire, 
consisting of nine statements about the subjective experience of the 
illusion. Agreement with these statements was indicated on a Likert 
scale involving seven steps (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). Due to the implementation of active finger movements, four 
items of the original questionnaire (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) were 
pointless and were substituted by items taken from Longo et al. 
(2008) and Kammers et al. (2009a). 
The questionnaire included four items which are related to the 
feeling of embodiment of the artificial hand (Longo et al., 2008) and 
five control items. Phenomenal embodiment was quantified by the 
mean response to the four embodiment-related items (items 1, 6, 7 
and 8 in Table 6). 
 
Statistical analysis According to the data of the perceptual 
responses, five logistic functions were fitted for each participant 
(baseline and four experimental conditions). These psychometric 
functions represent the probability of the response ‘dot was left of 
index’ depending on the dot’s position. Statistical analysis was based 
on the 50% thresholds (estimate for the perceived location of the 
right index finger) and the slopes (estimate for discrimination 
performance) of the psychometric functions. For four participants the 
algorithm for logistic functions did not converge the data in one of 
the experimental conditions, resulting in extreme and implausible 
slopes (values exceeded five times the standard deviation of all 
slopes). These data were excluded from the analysis of the 
perceptual task. 
78 Study 3 
Prior to analysis, individual baseline measures were subtracted 
from the data for the perceptual and the motor task. Due to the fact 
that the accuracy of pointing movements differs highly between 
individuals (Trojan et al., 2006), motor responses were weighted at 
the individual standard deviation of ten pointing movements during 
the baseline (ranging from 1.3cm to 3.1cm). All data were analyzed 
according to a linear mixed effects model (2*2 factorial design) 
including the factors induction method (passive touch vs. active 
movements) and synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous). 
Subjects were included as random factor. 
Single items of the RHI questionnaire (Table 6) were analyzed 
with two-tailed t-tests for paired samples. Correlation analyses (one-
tailed) were based on the differences between synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions. 
Statistical analysis was conducted using R (version 2.13.1). 
4.2.2 Results 
Phenomenal self-reports Exclusively for the embodiment-
related items (Longo et al., 2008), significant differences were found 
between the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions, 
independent of the induction method (items 1, 6, 7 and 8 in Table 6). 
Items 2 and 9 showed a difference for only one of the induction 
methods, and all other items did not reach a significant level for 
neither of the methods (Table 6). 
A linear mixed effects model analysis of the mean responses to 
the four embodiment-related items revealed a significant main effect 
of synchrony (F1/117=50.1, p<.001), but neither the main effect of 
induction method (F1/117=2.3, p=.13) nor the interaction effect 
(F1/117=.8, p=.37) was significant (Figure 10a). 
The phenomenal self-reports were correlated between the 
induction methods (r=.30, t38=1.9, p=.03), indicating that those 
participants, who reported a strong illusion after passive touch, were 
also more likely to report a strong illusion after active movements. 
Results are listed in Table 7. 
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Table 6 Mean responses (and standard deviation) to single items of the questionnaire. Items 1, 
6, 7 and 8 are indicative for the embodiment of the artificial hand (Longo et al., 2008). 
Significant differences between synchronous and asynchronous conditions were calculated 
according to two-tailed t-tests for paired samples (*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, n.s. p>.05). 
 passive touch active movements 
 sync. async. sign. sync. async. sign. 
1. It felt as if the artificial hand was 
my own hand. 
2. It felt as if my real right hand was 
drifting toward the left (toward the 
artificial hand). 
3. It seemed as if I had two right 
hands. 
4. My right hand felt numb. 
5. It felt as if the artificial hand 
drifted slowly toward the right 
(toward my own right hand). 
6. The artificial hand began to 
resemble my own right hand (in 
terms of shape, skin structure, etc.) 
7. It seemed as if the artificial hand 
was part of my body. 
8. It seemed as if I looked directly 
at my own hand, and not at an 
artificial one. 
9. It felt as if the artificial hand and 
my own right hand lay closer to 
each other (compared to the 
beginning of the trial). 
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Perceptual task To assure that perceptual responses were not 
influenced by the preceding motor responses, we compared the data 
of participants who performed a motor task previous to the 
perceptual task (N=22) with the data of participants for which the 
motor tasks were omitted (N=12). Two-tailed t-tests revealed no 
significant differences in the perceptual task between these groups, 
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neither for the baseline nor for any of the four experimental 
conditions (all p>.1). Furthermore, separate analyses for both groups 
showed equivalent results for the perceptual task. The motor task did 
not affect subsequent perceptual responses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Results according to linear mixed effects models for phenomenal self-reports, 
perceptual judgements and motor responses. (*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, n.s. p>.10). 
 
phenomenal 
self-reports 
perceptual task motor task 
 
linear mixed effects 
model 
 
   synchrony 
   induction 
   synchrony*induction 
 
perceived 
location 
(thresholds) 
discrimination 
performance 
(slopes) 
 
F1/117=50.1, *** 
F1/117=2.3, n.s. 
F1/117=0.8, n.s. 
F1/99=27.1, *** 
F1/99=0.6, n.s. 
F1/99=1.3, n.s. 
F1/99=5.0, * 
F1/99=0.6, n.s. 
F1/99=1.4, n.s. 
F1/76=4.9, * 
F1/76=6.8, * 
F1/76<0.1, n.s. 
correlation 
(between passive and 
active induction) 
r=.30, t38=1.9, * r=.43, t32=2.7, ** r=.01,t23<0.1,n.s 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Empirical data according to a) the phenomenal self-reports, b) the 
perceptual task and c) the motor task for the passive (top) and the active 
induction method (bottom). Dashed lines in the perceptual and the motor task 
(value of zero) indicate the perceived location of the right index finger during 
the baseline. Error bars show standard errors across subjects. 
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Synchrony had a significant effect on the proprioceptive drift 
towards the artificial hand (F1/99=27.1, p<.001), which was higher for 
the synchronous as compared to the asynchronous conditions (Figure 
10b). The induction method itself had no influence on the magnitude 
of the proprioceptive drift (F1/99=0.6, p=.44). The interaction between 
induction method and synchrony was not significant (F1/99=1.3, 
p=.27), showing that both induction methods were equally qualified 
to elicit a proprioceptive drift in the perceptual task. The results are 
listed in Table 7, and averaged psychometric functions for the 
perceptual judgements are depicted in Figure 11. 
Again, there was a significant correlation between the RHI 
effects after passive touch and those after active movements, i.e., the 
same participants demonstrated either a small or a large 
proprioceptive drift for the passive and the active induction method 
(r=.43, t32=2.7, p<.01). 
One advantage of the perceptual task implemented here is that it 
enables the assessment of discrimination performance, quantified by 
the slopes of the psychometric functions (Figure 11). The data for 
discrimination performance reflect the results for perceived location: 
a significant main effect was found for synchrony (F1/99=5.0, p=.03), 
while neither the induction method (F1/99=0.5, p=.46) nor its 
interaction with synchrony (F1/99=1.4, p=.24) had a significant effect 
on the discrimination performance (Table 7). The mean of slopes for 
synchronous conditions was 0.35 and for the asynchronous 
conditions 0.30, indicating that discrimination performance was 
better after synchronous as compared to asynchronous stimulation. 
 
Motor task The ballistic qualities of the pointing movements 
were confirmed by a mean movement time of 361ms (ranging from 
189ms to 536ms). 
Again, synchrony had a significant effect on task performance 
(F1/76=4.9, p=.02). The proprioceptive drift towards the artificial 
hand was higher for the synchronous than for the asynchronous 
conditions (Figure 10c). In contrast to the phenomenal self-reports 
and the perceptual task (Table 7), motor responses were significantly 
affected by the induction method (F1/76=6.8, p=.01), indicating that 
pointing movements were biased towards the artificial hand after 
active as compared to passive induction. No interaction between 
synchrony and induction method was found (F1/76<.1, p>.5). 
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Furthermore, performance in the motor task was not correlated 
between the induction methods, as it was the case for phenomenal 
self-reports and perceptual judgements (Table 7). Participants 
showing a relatively large pointing bias towards the artificial hand 
after passive touch were not necessarily those who showed a 
comparable pointing bias after active movements (r=.006, t23=.03, 
p=.49). 
 
 
Figure 11 Psychometric (logistic) functions for the perceptual task after 
passive (top) and active induction (bottom), based on averaged individual 
parameters. The abscissa indicates the dot’s position relative to the perceived 
location of the right index finger during the baseline (dashed vertical line). 
Error bars show standard errors across subjects. 
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4.3 Discussion 
In study 3 we implemented a version of the RHI paradigm based 
on active voluntary movements of body-extraneous objects. This was 
achieved by imposing voluntary control over finger movements of an 
artificial hand, which was unambiguously recognized as body-
extraneous. Alterations of body representations were quantified by 
means of phenomenal self-reports, perceptual judgements and motor 
responses, and directly compared to corresponding effects elicited by 
a mere perceptual version of the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). 
For both the passive and the active induction method, we found 
substantial differences between the synchronous and the 
asynchronous condition in all three measures (Figure 10). The type 
of induction exclusively affected motor responses, resulting in a 
larger proprioceptive drift after active as compared to passive 
induction. Phenomenal self-reports and perceptual judgements were 
not influenced by the induction method. Furthermore, differences 
between the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions in the 
motor task were not correlated between passive and active induction, 
as it was the case for phenomenal self-reports and perceptual 
judgements. 
Since active control over (unambiguously) body-extraneous 
objects has rarely been implemented in experimental settings (see 
Introduction and Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012), the comparable effects 
on phenomenal self-reports and perceptual responses are particularly 
important to validate the experimental set-up used in study 3. For 
both the phenomenal self-reports and the perceptual task, neither the 
main effect of induction method nor its interaction with synchrony 
was significant, indicating that both methods were equally qualified 
to induce the illusion (Figure 10 and Table 7). The RHI effect of 
passive touch on the motor task (i.e., pointing movements) contrasts 
with the results of Kammers et al. (2009a; 2009b), who found motor 
responses to be unaffected by the passive induction method. These 
authors concluded that the passive induction method exclusively 
affects the body image, while body-schematic representations are 
resistant against this kind of manipulation (Kammers et al., 2009a) 
The inconsistencies between the results from Kammers et al. 
(2009a; 2009b) and study 3 reflect the diverse findings in the 
scientific literature on this issue. While the effects on phenomenal 
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self-reports and perceptual responses are relatively consistent across 
several investigations (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Dummer et al., 
2009; Kammers et al., 2009a), many studies did reveal inconsistent 
evidence as to whether motor responses are affected by the RHI 
(Heed et al., 2011; Holmes et al., 2006; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; 
Kammers et al., 2009a; Kammers et al., 2009b; Kammers et al., 
2010). In study 3, two differences between the passive and the active 
induction method were found, which were specific for the motor 
task, and therefore should be considered for their explanatory value 
with regard to the inconsistencies on that issue. 
First, the performance in the motor task was not correlated 
between both induction methods, as it was the case with respect to 
the phenomenal self-reports and the perceptual task. The absence of 
this correlation indicates that individuals who are more susceptible to 
the passive induction method (quantified by pointing errors) are not 
necessarily more susceptible to the active induction method. 
Second, there was a significant main effect of the induction 
method on the performance in the motor task. In both the 
synchronous and the asynchronous condition, pointing movements 
were more biased towards the artificial hand when the illusion was 
induced by active movements as compared to passive touch (Figure 
10c). A similar finding was reported by Kammers et al. (2009b), who 
found a significant interaction between induction method and 
response type, indicating that perceptual responses were more 
affected by the passive induction method, while the active induction 
method had a pronounced influence on motor responses. A possible 
explanation for this specific result lies in the existence of shared 
representations for executed and observed movements (Decety & 
Sommerville, 2003; Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998; Grèzes & Decety, 
2001). A partial overlap between cortical networks, which are 
activated both by the self-execution of specific actions and by the 
mere observation of these actions executed by another agent, show 
that to a certain degree observed movements are processed in the 
same way as self-executed movements (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 
1998). According to these considerations, it is well comprehensible 
that the motor representations underlying pointing movements are 
influenced even by asynchronous movements of an artificial limb, 
which nevertheless might be regarded as body-extraneous. 
The overall pointing bias towards the artificial hand after active 
as compared to passive induction might as well reflect a tendency to 
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execute shorter pointing movements after pre-activation of the motor 
system. This possibility cannot be refuted on the basis of the present 
data, however, it seems implausible, because an influence of motor 
pre-activation was not reported in similar studies (Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2012; Kammers et al., 2009b). 
The absence of correlation between the passive and the active 
induction method suggests that body-schematic alterations are less 
stable than alterations of the body image. Although an effect of 
synchrony on pointing movements was found for both induction 
methods, these effects are based on varying subsets of participants. 
Unlike the effects on the perceptual task, to which individuals seem 
to be susceptible in a reliable manner, effects on the motor task are 
relatively short-lived (Rossetti, 1998). These considerations are 
relevant to explain inconsistent findings with respect to motor tasks. 
For example, Kammers et al. (2009b) previously compared the 
effects of passive and active induction of the RHI on perceptual and 
motor responses, and did not find a difference between synchronous 
and asynchronous conditions on motor responses, neither for the 
passive nor the active induction method. Two differences in the 
experimental design between study 3 and Kammers et al. (2009b) 
seem particularly relevant to explain this deviant result. First, our 
participants pointed with their non-stimulated towards the stimulated 
hand, directly indicating its perceived position, while in Kammers et 
al. (2009b), pointing movements were executed with the stimulated 
hand towards a visually defined external target, and the 
proprioceptive drift was assessed indirectly by inferring the 
perceived hand position from endpoint errors. Second, Kammers et 
al. (2009b) used a video-based version of the RHI. As discussed 
initially, participants are well aware of the non-materiality of 2D 
video-displayed images (Ijsselsteijn et al., 2006), which raises issues 
concerning the incorporation of external objects into body 
representations. Furthermore, top-down processes might interfere 
with the bottom-up effects of synchronous stimulation (or 
movements), because participants know that they are indeed looking 
at (an image of) their own hand (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first study applying the technique 
of fitting psychometric functions to judgements about hand location 
within the RHI. A valuable advantage of this technique consists in 
the assessment of discrimination performance, which can be 
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quantified by the slopes of psychometric functions. This is an 
important aspect, because decreased discrimination performance 
would affect the reliability of judgements on perceived hand 
location, and it seems plausible to assume decreased discrimination 
performance during the RHI. Our results demonstrate that 
discrimination performance is slightly increased after synchronous as 
compared to asynchronous conditions (Figure 11). Furthermore, it is 
shown that both the passive and the active induction method are 
equally qualified to induce this gain in discrimination performance 
(Table 7). 
Taken together, two characteristic differences were found 
between the induction via passive tactile sensations and active 
volitional movements, exclusively relating to the performance in the 
motor task. RHI specific effects were not correlated between the 
passive and the active induction method, and an overall pointing bias 
towards the artificial hand (i.e., independent of synchrony) was 
found for the active as compared to the passive induction method. 
The results of study 3 demonstrate that both perceptual 
judgements (presumably relying on an intact body image) and motor 
responses (presumably based on body-schematic processes) about 
body posture are affected by the passive and the active induction 
method for the RHI. Both passive tactile sensations and active 
volitional movements result in a phenomenal incorporation of an 
artificial hand and in a proprioceptive drift of the own towards the 
artificial hand. Nevertheless, characteristic differences concerning 
the motor task were revealed, causing doubts on the reliability of 
motor responses and thereby providing an explanation for the 
inconsistent findings in the scientific literature on this issue. 
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5 Study 4: Anatomical Constraints for 
Body Representations 
The notion of a congenital body-model has been supported by 
clinical observations of aplasic phantoms and experimental studies 
revealing anatomical constraints for changes in body representations, 
while other studies suggest a remarkable flexibility of body 
representations even exceeding a priori assumptions regarding body 
appearance and anatomy (e.g., the subjective embodiment of a third 
arm). 
Using the rubber hand illusion (RHI), in which a visible artificial 
hand is touched synchronously with the participant’s unseen own 
hand, we examined the role of anatomical congruence between 
stimuli at the artificial and the own hand. Based on considerations 
according to which the influence of anatomical congruence might 
differ for the sense of ownership and the sense of agency, two 
versions of the RHI paradigm were implemented, involving either 
passive tactile stimulation or active voluntary movements. 
5.1 Introduction 
The development of a bodily self (i.e., the conscious perception 
of ‘being’ or ‘having’ a body) is derived from two different aspects 
concerning the relation between the body and the external world, 
commonly referred to as body ownership and agency (Gallagher, 
2000; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Tsakiris et 
al., 2007b). Body ownership denotes the sense that one’s own body 
is the source of sensations (Tsakiris et al., 2006). External events at 
the bodily borders are directly perceived as somatic sensations, 
which can be described by the notion ‘What happens to this body, 
happens to me’. 
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Agency reflects the fact that phenomenal intentions to modify the 
external world can only be realized by controlling one’s own body 
movements (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Tsakiris et al., 2006). 
Intentional changes within the environment (e.g., lifting a cup) can 
only be caused indirectly, i.e., mediated by motor control over body 
parts (moving the hand towards the cup, grabbing it, etc.). This can 
be illustrated by the phrase ‘I can affect the world only by means of 
this body’. These two aspects (direct sensation and direct motor 
control) contribute to the perception of a strong connection between 
the own body and the phenomenal self, and ultimately to the 
development of a bodily self. 
Both the sense of ownership and the sense of agency can be 
manipulated within the paradigm of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), 
which is based on the multisensory integration of conflicting 
information about body posture (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Kalckert 
& Ehrsson, 2012; Kammers et al., 2009b; Tsakiris et al., 2006; 
Tsakiris et al., 2010). In the RHI, an artificial hand is placed visibly 
in front of the participant, whose own hand is hidden from view. By 
synchronously touching the artificial and the real hand, or by 
synchronizing the movements of both hands, a multisensory conflict 
between visual and proprioceptive information about hand posture 
can be induced, resulting in the illusory feeling of ownership and/or 
agency over the artificial hand. The subjective feeling of 
embodiment is accompanied by a shift of the perceived location of 
the own hand towards the artificial hand, a phenomenon which 
generally is referred to as proprioceptive drift (Kammers et al., 
2009a; Tsakiris et al., 2006). 
Many studies indicated that the embodiment of the artificial hand 
depends on an anatomically correct appearance (Holmes et al., 2006) 
and the physical connectedness to the body (Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Pavani et al., 2000), supporting the assumption of a congenital body-
model (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). On the other hand, remarkable changes 
in body representations have been reported after visual exposure to 
anatomically implausible (e.g., a lengthened arm, Schaefer et al., 
2007) and even after anatomically impossible body configurations 
(e.g., a third arm, Guterstam et al., 2011; Schaefer et al., 2009). 
In a study by Schaefer et al. (2006), participants received tactile 
stimuli at the little finger of their left hand while watching 
synchronous stimulations on the thumb of a virtual hand. Due to the 
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anatomical incongruence, participants reported a referred sensation 
(i.e., they felt the touches on their thumb instead of their little 
finger), the degree of which was significantly correlated with short-
term alterations in the topography of the primary somatosensory 
cortex. This raises the question whether alterations of body 
representations depend more on the consistency of visual feedback 
rather than on its anatomical congruence, because in the study by 
Schaefer et al. (2006) the somatosensory effects of the visible stimuli 
were absolutely reliable and predictable. In other words, the visual 
feedback was anatomically incongruent in a very consistent manner. 
The predictability of bodily effects is an important factor for the 
emergence of a sense of agency, even if those effects are discordant 
with efferent motor commands (Sato, 2009; Wegner & Wheatley, 
1999; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Therefore, it seems 
plausible that a consistent coupling between motor commands and 
bodily effects can compensate for their anatomical incongruence. 
Several studies suggested a specific role of motor activity for 
modulations of body representations (Braun et al., 2001; Moseley & 
Brugger, 2009; Schaefer et al., 2005), but studies on the processing 
of anatomically incongruent movements are rare (Fink et al., 1999). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that humans are extremely sensitive 
to incongruent visual feedback about their own movements at a very 
early developmental stage (Morgan & Rochat, 1997). 
The influence of predictability on the sense of agency has been 
investigated mainly in terms of perceived causation of external 
effects (e.g., sounds or visual stimuli), adopting a body-independent 
definition of agency (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Linser & 
Goschke, 2007; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; 
Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010). However, perceived control 
over own body movements and perceived control over body-external 
events are very different aspects of agency (Sartre, 1943/1958; 
Wegner et al., 2004). This important distinction was referred to by 
Sartre, when he recognized that ‘I use my pen in order to form letters 
but not my hand in order to hold the pen. I am not in relation to my 
hand in the same utilizing attitude as I am in relation to the pen; I am 
my hand.’ (Sartre, 1943/1958, p.323). On the same account, Wegner 
et al. (2004) suggested the distinction of authorship processing 
(agency for body movements) and causal attribution (agency for 
environmental effects). This distinction is especially relevant for the 
investigation of the dynamic qualities of body representations. In 
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study 4 we focus on perceived agency for body movements, without 
accounting for the indirect external effects of those movements. 
Study 4 was conducted to investigate the impact of anatomical 
congruence and coupling consistency on changes in body 
representations. We implemented a passive and an active version of 
the RHI paradigm, based on passive tactile stimulation or active 
voluntary movements of the artificial and the real hand, respectively. 
Anatomical incongruence was realized by a reversed coupling of 
index and middle fingers of the artificial and the real hand, and 
coupling inconsistency by a random variation of congruent and 
incongruent coupling. 
According to the assumption of a congenital body-model, the 
embodiment of the artificial hand should depend on the anatomical 
congruence, but not on coupling consistency. Embodiment of the 
artificial hand was quantified by phenomenal self-reports and a 
perceptual measure of proprioceptive drift. 
5.2 Experiment 
5.2.1 Methods 
Participants 28 right-handed participants (7 males, mean age 
was 27.8 years) were recruited from the University of Mannheim and 
the local community. Participation was compensated either 
monetarily or with course credits (for psychology students). All 
participants gave written informed consent to the experiment. 
 
Experimental set-up Participants sat at a desk and placed their 
hands in a wooden framework (125cm*50cm*25cm). Vision of their 
right hand was prevented by an occluding screen. An artificial right 
hand made of wood and containing flexible joints at the sockets of 
the digits was placed visibly in front of the participants, 15cm to the 
left of their own right hand (measured from the index fingers). A 
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skin-colored rubber glove was slipped over the artificial hand. 
Participants were instructed to adjust their body midline halfway 
between the artificial right hand and their own left hand, which was 
placed 31cm to the left of the artificial hand. Body posture and 
arrangement of real and artificial hands were identical to study 3, so 
a graphical depiction of the experimental set-up is provided by 
Figure 9a and 9c. Index and middle fingers of the artificial hand 
could be lifted and lowered via pneumatically driven plungers, which 
were embedded in the framework. Invisible to the participants, the 
plungers were controlled by capacitive sensors placed beneath the 
participants’ right index and middle fingers. In this vein, the 
experimental set-up enabled the experience of direct control over the 
finger movements of the artificial hand. 
 
Experimental conditions For both the passive and the active 
induction method, four experimental conditions were implemented 
(Table 8). 
In the congruent condition, the participants’ right hand and the 
artificial hand were stroked synchronously with two paint brushes in 
an anatomically congruent manner (i.e., either both index fingers or 
both middle fingers). The incongruent condition consisted in 
synchronous stroking of anatomically unrelated fingers (i.e., the real 
index and the artificial middle finger or the real middle and the 
artificial index finger). Importantly, in both the congruent and the 
incongruent condition the combination of real and artificial fingers, 
whether anatomically congruent or not, was invariable, and therefore 
predictable, throughout the particular induction phases. 
In the inconsistent condition, the consistency of coupling 
between real and artificial fingers was eliminated by 
unsystematically alternating the combination of real and artificial 
fingers. Tactile stimuli were applied synchronously to the real and 
the artificial hand in an anatomically correct or incorrect manner. A 
control condition including asynchronous stimulation served as a 
reference for the congruent condition to quantify basic RHI effects. 
Apart from a temporal delay (distributed between 0.5 and 2 seconds) 
between corresponding stimuli at the real and the artificial hand, the 
control condition was identical to the congruent condition. In all 
conditions involving passive touch, stimulus combinations were 
applied every 5 to 10 seconds. 
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Table 8 Experimental conditions adapted to the passive and the active induction 
method in study 4. Associated pairs of conditions for testing the impact of temporal 
synchrony, anatomical congruence and coupling consistency are shaded accordingly. 
experimental 
condition 
temporal 
synchrony 
anatomical 
congruence 
coupling 
consistency 
control asynchronous   
congruent synchronous congruent consistent 
incongruent synchronous incongruent consistent 
inconsistent synchronous incongruent inconsistent 
 
 
 
 
To compare the RHI effects after passive touch with those after 
active movements, four analogous conditions were implemented for 
the induction by active movements. Finger movements of the 
participants’ right hand were accompanied by synchronous finger 
movements of the artificial hand. The coupling between real and 
artificial fingers was either anatomically congruent, incongruent or 
unsystematically varying (inconsistent). In the control condition, 
congruent finger movements of the artificial hand were delayed by 
0.5 to 2 seconds. In all movement conditions, participants were 
instructed to shortly lift either their index or their middle finger (but 
not both at the same time), approximately every 3 to 5 seconds. 
Furthermore, they were asked to maintain an approximately equal 
ratio between movements of the index and the middle finger. 
Each of the resulting eight experimental conditions involved an 
induction phase (1.5min), the assessment of proprioceptive drift 
(2min) and the completion of a questionnaire (approx. 1min). All 
conditions of the same induction method were performed 
successively. The order of induction method as well as the order of 
conditions (within each method) was randomized across subjects, but 
kept constant for both methods (within subjects). 
 
Proprioceptive drift The procedure for the assessment of 
proprioceptive drift was executed previous to the experiment 
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(baseline) and after each of the eight experimental conditions. After 
the induction phase, participants were instructed to close their eyes. 
The experimenter removed the occluding screen and placed a 
computer monitor (52cm*29.5cm, LG Electronics Flatron W2443T) 
horizontally above the artificial and the real right hand, completely 
occluding them from sight (Figure 9c). Participants then were asked 
to open their eyes and to judge the positions of a series of red dots 
appearing for 100ms on the screen (white background). Specifically, 
they had to indicate for each single dot, whether it was located to the 
left or to the right of their own right index finger. Each dot 
(2mm*2mm) was presented at one of fourteen possible positions, 
which were interspaced by 1cm and arranged along the horizontal 
plane in the middle of the monitor. To minimize ceiling and floor 
effects, the relative positions of the dots to the real right index finger 
were adjusted for each individual on the basis of the baseline data. 
Participants were asked to which side the dot would have to 
move to be exactly over their right index finger. Responses were 
given via a computer mouse with the left hand. The left button 
indicated that the participants’ index finger was perceived at the left 
side of the dot, and the right button indicated that it was perceived to 
the right of the dot. Participants were urged to respond as fast as 
possible. Responses later than 1s or earlier than 200ms from the 
dot’s onset were discarded. 
The dots were presented seven times at each of the 14 possible 
locations in randomized order, resulting in a total of 98 trials. The 
intertrial interval between the response and the appearance of the 
next dot was set to 1s. This procedure enables the assessment of 
discrimination performance and has been approved in study 3. 
Stimulus sequences were controlled using Presentation v14.2 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., CA, USA). 
 
Phenomenal self-reports After the assessment of proprioceptive 
drift, participants completed an RHI questionnaire, consisting of nine 
statements regarding the subjective experience of the illusion during 
the induction phase. Agreement with these statements was indicated 
on a Likert scale involving seven steps (-3 = strongly disagree, 3 = 
strongly agree). Questionnaire items were selected from an extensive 
psychometric study (Longo et al., 2008) and are listed in Table 9. 
According to Longo et al. (2008), four items referred to the 
embodiment of the artificial hand (items 1 and 6 in Table 9 
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representing body ownership and items 2 and 7 representing body 
agency12), two items targeted the affective valence of the experience 
(items 3 and 8) and three items served as control questions (items 4, 
5 and 9). 
 
 
 
Table 9 Item labels used in study 4 and their categories according to Longo et al. 
(2008). 
item label item category 
1. It felt as if the artificial hand was my own hand. 
2. It seemed like I could grab something with the artificial hand. 
3. I found that experience enjoyable. 
4. It seemed like I had three hands. 
5. I had the sensation that my hand was numb. 
6. It seemed like the artificial hand was part of my body. 
7. It seemed like I could make a fist with the artificial hand. 
8. I found that experience interesting. 
9. It seemed like my hand had disappeared. 
embodiment (ownership) 
embodiment (agency) 
affect 
control question 
control question 
embodiment (ownership) 
embodiment (agency) 
affect 
control question 
 
 
 
Statistical analysis Proprioceptive drift was quantified by means 
of psychometric functions, calculated on the basis of the data from 
the perceptual task. Logistic functions were fitted for each of the 
experimental conditions and the baseline, representing the 
probability of the response ‘dot was left of index’ depending on the 
dot’s position. The 50% thresholds of these psychometric functions 
were used as an estimate for the perceived location of the right index 
finger, and the slopes of the same functions served as a measure for 
discrimination performance. Regarding the 50% thresholds, 
individual baseline values were subtracted from the values for the 
experimental conditions. 
                                                          
12
 Due to the implementation of controlled finger movements of the artificial hand, the 
agency items tested in Longo et al. (2008) were not appropriate and were modified for 
study 4 (see Table 9). 
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The questionnaire data were averaged according to the subscales 
‘ownership’, ‘agency’, ‘affect’ and ‘control’ (Table 9) for each 
participant (Longo et al., 2008). 
Statistical analysis was based on linear mixed effects models as 
implemented in package ‘nlme’ for R software (version 2.13.1). 
Subjects were specified as random factor. 
5.2.2 Results 
Temporal synchrony According to conventions within RHI 
studies, the general efficiency of the experimental set-up was 
verified by comparing the effects of synchronous and asynchronous 
touch/movements (Figure 12). Linear mixed effects models 
including the factors ‘synchrony’ (congruent condition vs. control 
condition) and ‘induction method’ (passive touch vs. active 
movements) revealed a significant main effect of synchrony on the 
perceptual task (F1/81=10.6, p=.002), the embodiment-related 
questionnaire items (ownership: F1/81=55.9, p<.001; agency: 
 
 
Figure 12 Comparison between the congruent condition (black bars) and the 
control condition (grey bars), which differed exclusively in the temporal 
synchrony between touches at (or movements of) the real and the artificial 
hand. 
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F1/81=30.0, p<.001) and the affect-related questionnaire items 
(F1/81=53.7, p<.001). Importantly, synchrony did not affect the 
responses to control items (F1/81=1.2, p=.28). 
The main effect of induction method was significant only for the 
ownership and the affect items of the questionnaire (ownership: 
F1/81=16.2, p<.001; affect: F1/81=24.3, p<.001), but not for the agency 
items (F1/81=0.5, p=.49) and the perceptual task (F1/81=0.5, p=.49). 
Perceived ownership of the artificial hand and affective valence were 
higher after passive touch than after active movements, independent 
of synchrony (Figure 12). 
Significant interactions between synchrony and induction method 
regarding embodiment-related items (ownership: F1/81=5.1, p=.03; 
agency: F1/81=5.7, p=.02) indicate that the effect of synchrony was 
more pronounced after active movements than after passive touch 
(Figure 12). This advantage of the active induction method was 
restricted to phenomenal self-reports and could not be verified 
regarding the perceptual task (F1/81=0.3, p>=.5). Also no interaction 
was found for affective valence (F1/81=3.0, p=.09). 
 
Anatomical congruence To examine the importance of an 
anatomically congruent mapping between the own and the artificial 
fingers, we compared the effects of the congruent condition with 
those of the incongruent condition (Figure 13). A significant main 
 
 
Figure 13 Comparison between the congruent condition (black bars) and the 
incongruent condition (grey bars), which differed exclusively in the anatomical 
congruence of coupling between fingers of the real and the artificial hand. 
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effect of anatomical congruence was found for the perceptual task 
(F1/81=6.7, p=.01) and the embodiment-related and affect-related 
questionnaire items (ownership: F1/81=29.5, p<.001; agency: 
F1/81=15.4, p<.001; affect: F1/81=30.9, p<.001). Proprioceptive drift, 
perceived embodiment and affective valence were higher after 
congruent conditions. 
Again, only the ownership and affect items were affected by the 
induction method (perceptual task: F1/81=1.5, p=.22; ownership: 
F1/81=4.3, p=.04; agency: F1/81=0.2, p>.5; affect: F1/81=15.6, p<.001), 
showing a higher degree of perceived ownership and affective 
valence after the passive as compared to the active induction method 
(Figure 13). Contrary to the considerations regarding a differential 
impact of anatomical congruence for passive touch and active 
movements, no interactions between anatomical congruence and the 
induction methods were found (perceptual task: F1/81<0.1, p>.5; 
ownership: F1/81=0.2, p>.5; agency: F1/81=1.2, p=.28; affect: 
F1/81=0.2, p>.5). 
 
Coupling consistency The impact of consistency with respect to 
the coupling between own and artificial fingers was assessed by a 
comparison between the incongruent and the inconsistent conditions 
(Figure 14). Both of these experimental conditions involved 
anatomically incongruent feedback, but in the incongruent 
 
 
Figure 14 Comparison between the incongruent condition (black bars) and the 
inconsistent condition (grey bars), which differed exclusively in the 
consistency of coupling between fingers of the real and the artificial hand. 
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conditions, the coupling of artificial and real fingers was invariable 
and absolutely reliable, while in the inconsistent condition, the 
coupling between own and artificial fingers changed at random. 
Neither for the perceptual task (F1/81=0.3, p>.5) nor for the 
embodiment-related and affect-related questionnaire items 
(ownership: F1/81=0.2, p>.5; agency: F1/81<0.1, p>.5; affect: F1/81=1.3, 
p=.25) a main effect of coupling consistency could be confirmed. 
Again, the method of induction had a selective effect on 
ownership and affect items (ownership: F1/81=11.4, p=.001; affect: 
F1/81=16.0, p<.001), while neither the perceptual task (F1/81=1.5, 
p=.22) nor the agency items (F1/81=1.0, p=.32) were influenced by 
this factor (Figure 14). No interactions between coupling consistency 
and induction method were found (perceptual task: F1/81<0.1, p>.5; 
ownership: F1/81=0.6, p=.42; agency: F1/81<0.1, p>.5; affect: 
F1/81<0.1, p>.5). 
 
Discrimination performance Regarding discrimination 
performance, quantified by the slopes of the psychometric functions, 
which were calculated according to the data from the perceptual task, 
no significant differences were found throughout study 4 (all p>.05). 
Mean slope for all experimental conditions was .22, ranging between 
.20 and .25. Thus, the proprioceptive drifts reported above were not 
accompanied by a higher or lower certainty regarding the perceived 
location of the own right index finger. 
5.3 Discussion 
Study 4 aimed at investigating the importance of anatomical 
congruence and coupling consistency for alterations of body 
representations during the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). The 
concept of a congenital body-model (De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) predicts a high impact of anatomical 
congruence between visual and sensorimotor information about the 
own body, but several experimental findings challenge this view by 
claiming that constraints regarding body appearance and anatomy 
can be overcome (Guterstam et al., 2011; Schaefer et al., 2007; 
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Schaefer et al., 2009). The constitutive factor might rather consist in 
the coupling consistency, i.e., the reliability of coupling between 
fingers at the real and the artificial hand, independent of the 
anatomical plausibility of this coupling. 
These contrary views were tested for body ownership and 
agency, two different aspects of the bodily self (Gallagher, 2000; 
Tsakiris et al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2007b). Two versions of the RHI 
paradigm were implemented, one based on passive touch and the 
other on active movements. In different experimental conditions, 
anatomical congruence and coupling consistency were systematically 
varied. A manipulation check, comparing synchronous against 
asynchronous conditions, confirmed that the experimental set-up was 
valid to induce an RHI, both regarding a perceptual task and 
phenomenal self-reports (Figure 12). For the phenomenal self-
reports, enhanced RHI effects were found for the active as compared 
to the passive induction method, but this advantage was not reflected 
by the performance in the perceptual task. Furthermore, it can be 
inferred from Figure 12 that the pronounced effect after active 
movements was not due to more agreement to the items after the 
synchronous conditions, but rather to less agreement after the 
asynchronous conditions (i.e., asynchronous movements resulted in 
less agreement than asynchronous touches). 
The results of study 4 are in line with the assumption of a 
congenital body-model (De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009). The 
comparison between anatomically congruent and incongruent 
feedback conditions (Figure 13) indicates that the effectiveness of 
the RHI depends on the anatomical congruence of the coupling 
between real and artificial fingers. In contrast, the comparison 
between consistent and inconsistent feedback conditions shows that 
coupling consistency, independent of anatomical congruence, has no 
influence on the strength of the illusion (Figure 14). These results 
strongly support the assumption of a congenital body-model, 
conform with previous reports of anatomical constraints regarding 
the incorporation of artificial limbs (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Holmes et 
al., 2006; Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), and extend 
them by showing that anatomical congruence is equally important 
for both the sense of ownership and the sense of agency. Neither 
regarding anatomical congruence nor regarding coupling consistency 
interactions with the induction methods (passive touch and active 
movements) have been found for any of the dependent variables. The 
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temporal synchrony between stimuli (or movements) at the own and 
an artificial hand, being a strong predictor and a necessary condition 
for the RHI, does not elicit the incorporation of an artificial hand, 
which deviates from specific a priori assumptions regarding body 
appearance and anatomy. 
The notion of an invariant congenital body-model which is 
resistant to deviant sensory feedback (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; 
De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) is further 
confirmed by clinical reports of phantom sensations in patients who 
were born without the respective limb (Brugger et al., 2000; 
Gallagher et al., 1998; Ramachandran, 1993). Such aplasic phantoms 
can persist for a life-time, notwithstanding the absence of afferent 
feedback from the missing limb (Melzack et al., 1997). However, 
alternative explanations of aplasic phantoms based on postnatal 
learning processes have also been raised (Price, 2006). 
 
Another interesting result of study 4 consists in the main effect of 
induction method (irrespective of the experimental conditions) 
leading to a higher level of agreement after passive touch as 
compared to active movements. This main effect was exclusively 
found for perceived ownership and affective valence with respect to 
all three comparisons (Figure 12-14). Induction method had no effect 
on the perceptual task and on the agency items. While a greater 
affective valence of touches with soft paint brushes can be explained 
in terms of affective touch (Essick et al., 2010), it seems rather 
peculiar that, with respect to measures of embodiment, exclusively 
perceived ownership was enhanced after passive touch as compared 
to active movements. Subjectively perceived ownership seems to be 
particularly susceptible to passive tactile stimulation, regardless of 
whether the felt touches are asynchronous, anatomically incongruent 
or inconsistently combined with the seen touches at the artificial 
hand. 
Based on evidence that the affective components of touch are 
processed within the insular cortex (C. McCabe, Rolls, Bilderbeck, 
& McGlone, 2008; H. Olausson et al., 2002; H. W. Olausson et al., 
2008), a region which has also been shown to play a role in bodily 
self awareness (A. D. Craig, 2009; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, 
Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Karnath, Baier, & Nagele, 2005), it might 
be speculated whether the effect on perceived ownership is mediated 
by insula activations. Indeed, activations in the right posterior insula 
Study 4 101 
have been discussed as a neural correlate of perceived ownership 
over the body (Tsakiris et al., 2007a). An involvement of the insula 
region was also proposed for the experience of agency (Farrer & 
Frith, 2002), but due to the absence of any movements during the 
passive induction method it is well conceivable that perceived 
agency was unaffected. Nevertheless, it remains unexplained why 
the increased feeling of ownership after passive touch was not 
reflected by the perceptual measure of proprioceptive drift. 
 
It has been argued that deviant visual feedback regarding efferent 
motor commands might be the source of pathological pain in patients 
with limb amputations (Harris, 1999; C. S. McCabe, Haigh, 
Halligan, & Blake, 2005; Moseley & Gandevia, 2005). This 
hypothesis is based on observations suggesting a link between 
aversive sensations and incongruent sensory feedback about own 
body movements (Fink et al., 1999) and is further supported by the 
fact that phantom pain can be relieved by providing the patients with 
congruent visual feedback regarding their intended movements with 
the amputated limb (Diers, Christmann, Koeppe, Ruf, & Flor, 2010; 
Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996). Though it might be 
questionable whether incongruent visual feedback about own body 
movements really triggers pain (Moseley & Gandevia, 2005), or 
rather a wide spectrum of strange and maybe unpleasant sensations, 
as in the study by McCabe et al. (2005), a relevant question in the 
context of this discussion is whether negative affect is specifically 
associated with incongruent feedback regarding body movements or 
with incongruent feedback regarding bodily sensations in general. 
The assessment of affective valence in study 4 enables the 
examination of this issue. Anatomically incongruent movements of 
the artificial hand significantly reduced the affective valence during 
the respective condition. The effect of incongruent feedback, 
however, was not specific for movements, but was also found for 
passive touch (Figure 13d). The case of incongruent sensory 
feedback in amputees might be reflected more precisely by the 
comparison between synchronous and asynchronous visual feedback, 
because, strictly speaking, motor commands of amputees are not 
accompanied by incongruent movements but by no movements at all. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of temporal synchrony revealed the same 
pattern: the significant effect of asynchronous visual feedback on 
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affective valence was not restricted to movements and also found for 
passive touch (Figure 12d). 
 
In summary, the results from study 4 reveal a critical constraint 
on the plasticity of body representations. The incorporation of 
artificial hands into a representation of the own body within the RHI 
paradigm is constrained by an anatomically congruent coupling 
between fingers of the own and the artificial hand. The anatomical 
congruence is equally important for both the original version of the 
RHI, based on passive tactile stimulation, and a modified version, 
involving active motor control over the artificial hand. 
The strong effect of anatomical congruence combined with the 
absent effect of coupling consistency, a pattern which was found for 
both the feeling of body ownership and agency as well as for a more 
indirect measure of proprioceptive drift, constitutes new evidence for 
the existence of a congenital body-model and provides insights 
concerning its impact on alterations of body representations. 
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6 General Discussion 
Various studies have shown that the representations of the human 
body and the peripersonal space immediately surrounding this body 
are subject to extensive dynamic changes (Longo & Lourenco, 2007; 
Lourenco & Longo, 2009; Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005). For example, representations of peripersonal space 
can be extended and compressed, depending on short-term 
alterations of reaching distance (Longo & Lourenco, 2006; Lourenco 
& Longo, 2009). When using a rake, this reaching distance is 
expanded compared to a situation in which we can manipulate our 
environment only within arm length. As a result, far space becomes 
relevant for our immediate actions and the representation of the 
space surrounding us adjusts according to this modification (Berti & 
Frassinetti, 2000; Longo & Lourenco, 2006; Maravita & Iriki, 2004). 
The same situation can also be described in terms of dynamic 
changes in body representations (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010). In 
accordance with the notion that ‘the draughtsman’s immediate 
perception seems to be of the point of his pencil, the surgeon’s of the 
end of his knife, the duellist’s of the tip of his rapier as it plunges 
through his enemy’s skin’ (James, 1890/1950, vol.2, p.37-38), tool-
use has been shown to modulate the representation of the body 
(Cardinali et al., 2011; Johnson-Frey, 2003; Maravita & Iriki, 2004; 
Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001). According to this view, the 
utilization of the rake, accompanied by the feeling of controlling it, 
induces a change in the representation of the own body (Head & 
Holmes, 1911; Maravita & Iriki, 2004). This example not only 
shows that alterations of body representations usually coincide with 
alterations of spatial representations, but rather that the concepts of 
the body and peripersonal space are fundamentally connected to each 
other (Cardinali et al., 2009a; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Holmes & 
Spence, 2004). 
The major goals of this thesis were twofold. In the first part 
(studies 1 and 2), it was investigated how postural body 
representations affect the representation of peripersonal space, while 
the second part (studies 3 and 4) was an attempt to identify some of 
the necessary and sufficient preconditions for alterations of body 
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representations. The present chapter will be dedicated to a discussion 
of the implications and conclusions which can be derived from this 
thesis. To provide a solid basis for this general discussion, I will 
summarize the main results from the studies described in the 
previous four chapters. 
6.1 Main Results 
Study 1 and 2 demonstrated that the representation of 
peripersonal space varies depending on alterations of body posture. 
By comparing tactile localization in a vertical as compared to a 
woven posture of the hands (Figure 1a), study 1 showed that both 
finger and hand processing is influenced by a postural representation 
of the body. Furthermore, the direction of this postural effect was 
modulated by the task in question, i.e., whether attention was 
directed to a differentiation of hand laterality or finger type. Finger 
processing was facilitated in the woven posture, while the processing 
of hands was ameliorated in the vertical posture (Figures 4 and 5). 
In study 2, dynamics in the representation of peripersonal space 
were investigated by the comparison of tactile hand identification in 
an adjacent as compared to a separated posture of the hands (Figure 
6a). Supplementary to a general facilitative effect of the separated 
posture on tactile identification of hand laterality, it was shown that 
the performance was modulated by the spatial distance between the 
tactile stimuli and the non-stimulated hand (i.e., the hand 
representing a different response). Reaction times towards tactile 
stimuli were faster with increasing distance between the spatial 
coordinates of a tactile stimulus and those of the non-stimulated hand 
(Figure 6b). The comparison between a right-enclosed and a left-
enclosed posture, which were also implemented in study 2, revealed 
no significant differences in the performance of tactile hand 
identification (Figure 7). 
Study 3 and 4 investigated the dynamic qualities of body 
representations. Keeping the veridical posture of the right hand 
constant, we tested the influence of visual feedback about passive 
tactile stimulations and active movements on the subjectively 
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perceived posture of the right hand. In study 3, we found that both 
the passive and the active induction method of the RHI were capable 
of eliciting a strong subjective feeling of ownership over an artificial 
limb. These phenomenal self-reports were accompanied by a 
significant proprioceptive drift of the own towards the artificial hand, 
as measured by means of a perceptual task and a motor task (Figure 
10). Further important results of study 3 consisted in a higher 
proprioceptive drift after active movements as compared to passive 
touch, which was specific for the performance in the motor task and 
absent for phenomenal self-reports and perceptual responses. 
Furthermore, and again specific for the motor task, the differences 
between synchronous and asynchronous feedback did not correlate 
between the passive and the active induction method (Table 7). 
These results suggest a fundamental distinctiveness of motor 
responses compared to perceptual responses and phenomenal self-
reports, which has important implications for the implementation of 
motor tasks as well as for the interpretation of respective findings. 
In study 4 we examined the influence of anatomical congruence 
regarding the visual feedback within the RHI on the incorporation of 
an artificial limb. For both the passive and the active induction 
method, it was found that anatomically incongruent feedback (i.e., 
reversed coupling of index and middle fingers of the own and the 
artificial hand) abolished the subjectively perceived incorporation of 
the artificial hand. The impact of anatomical congruence was 
confirmed by a perceptual measure of proprioceptive drift as well as 
by ownership-related and agency-related questionnaire items (Figure 
13). Study 4 also investigated the importance of coupling 
consistency (i.e., the reliability of the coupling between real and 
artificial fingers), but for both passive touch and active movements, 
no influences were found, neither regarding the perceptual task nor 
the phenomenal self-reports (Figure 14). 
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6.2 Discussion and Implications 
The representations of body and peripersonal space are closely 
linked (Cardinali et al., 2009a; Holmes & Spence, 2004). This is 
clearly acknowledged by the fact that the concept of peripersonal 
space is defined with strict reference to the bodily borders, i.e., as the 
space immediately surrounding the body (Legrand et al., 2007; 
Làdavas & Farnè, 2004; Makin et al., 2008). Consequently, 
alterations of body representations should coincide with alterations 
of the representation of peripersonal space. An increase in the 
represented arm length, which is discussed as an effect of tool-use 
(Cardinali et al., 2011; Head & Holmes, 1911; Johnson-Frey, 2003; 
Maravita & Iriki, 2004), also extends the space surrounded by the 
represented body (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010). 
The results of this thesis reveal new evidence for the 
interdependency of body and space representations. Study 1 and 2 
showed that modifications of the postural representation of the body 
(by varying body posture) induce changes in the representation of 
peripersonal space. Dependent on the hand’s posture, tactile stimuli 
were processed differently. Conversely, study 3 and 4 confirmed, in 
accordance with previous studies on the RHI, that the spatial 
displacement of visual feedback concerning tactile stimuli affects the 
postural representation of the body. 
These findings are in line with theoretical assumptions about the 
interrelation between the representations of body and peripersonal 
space (Cardinali et al., 2009a; Làdavas & Farnè, 2004) and extend 
previous insights into this issue (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Overvliet 
et al., 2011; Shore et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2004). Study 1 provides 
a framework for a thorough description of peripersonal space 
representations in terms of response fields. This concept, which was 
further elaborated in study 2, accounts for a variety of observations 
concerning the localization of tactile stimuli within an external frame 
of reference (Driver & Grossenbacher, 1996; Lloyd, 2007; Shore et 
al., 2005; Soto-Faraco et al., 2004) and inspired a reinterpretation of 
the results of Haggard et al. (2006) regarding the spatial 
representations of fingers and hands. Study 3 and 4 corroborate 
previous findings on the influence of spatially displaced visual 
feedback of tactile stimuli on alterations of postural body 
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representations by illuminating necessary and sufficient 
preconditions for these alterations. 
Before addressing the dynamic qualities of body and space 
representations, an issue raised by several authors needs to be 
considered: if representations of the body and of peripersonal space 
are so fundamentally linked, why do we need separate concepts for 
these representations, and wouldn’t it be appropriate to integrate 
these concepts into a single one (Cardinali et al., 2009a; Holmes & 
Spence, 2004)? Though there is no ultimate answer to that question 
to date, there are possibilities which might resolve this issue in the 
future. One of these possibilities consists in the discovery of 
empirical dissociations between the representations of body and 
peripersonal space. For example, Cardinali et al. (2009a) speculated 
about alterations of peripersonal space representations accompanied 
by a non-altered body-schema, which might be induced by active 
motor control over body-extraneous objects in far space. Such an 
experimental modulation, so the authors argue, should affect the 
representation of the space relevant for immediate self-generated 
actions, but not the representation of the body, because anatomical 
constraints concerning the connectedness of body parts would be 
violated (Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The 
experimental set-up, developed and validated in study 3 and 4 of this 
thesis, constitutes a suitable basis for testing this specific prediction, 
because the movable artificial hand can easily be placed far away 
from the participants, without any limitations concerning the 
synchrony of voluntary movements of the real and the artificial hand 
(see section 6.2.5). 
6.2.1 Dynamics of Spatial Representations and the Concept of 
Response Fields 
Based on the results of study 1 and 2, response fields are 
proposed as a conceptual framework for the description of 
peripersonal space representations. Specific spatial areas within 
peripersonal space (defined by the position of certain body parts) 
receive more attentional resources than others. For example, the 
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space immediately surrounding the hands (often referred to as near-
hand or peri-hand space) is overrepresented, because it is more 
relevant for immediate behavior than more remote areas (Làdavas et 
al., 1998; Makin et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2006; Reed et al., 2010). 
The concept of response fields states that peripersonal space is 
represented as a conglomeration of discrete spatial components, 
which are weighted according to their relevance for a specific task. 
Regarding tactile identification of body parts, this segmentation of 
peripersonal space facilitates the association between tactile stimuli, 
localized within one of these segments (i.e., with respect to an 
external reference system), and the specific body parts, by which 
they are defined. In this vein, assigning a tactile stimulus to the 
touched body part only requires the distinction of discrete spatial 
areas in peripersonal space, and the localization of the stimulus 
within one of these response fields. 
The concept of response fields can explain a variety of 
experimental findings (e.g., those reported by Driver & 
Grossenbacher, 1996; Haggard et al., 2006; Shore et al., 2005; Soto-
Faraco et al., 2004; Zampini et al., 2005). The processing of tactile 
stimuli should be ameliorated with a higher distance between 
response fields, which was found in experiment 1 of study 2 and in 
several other studies (Driver & Grossenbacher, 1996; Gallace & 
Spence, 2005; Shore et al., 2005; Soto-Faraco et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, reports of an impaired discrimination between tactile 
stimuli at the right and the left hand, when hands are interleaved 
(Haggard et al., 2006; Zampini et al., 2005) can be accounted for by 
an overlap of the respective response fields (study 1 and 2). Figure 
8b depicts the response fields for the right and the left hand for 
several postural conditions. 
 
In the present thesis, response fields in peripersonal space have 
been investigated with respect to the tactile domain. There is 
evidence that response fields are also applicable within other sensory 
modalities and might be a useful approach to understand the 
mechanisms of multisensory integration in peripersonal space (e.g., 
Lakens, Schneider, Jostmann, & Schubert, 2011; Lloyd, 2007). For 
example, Lloyd (2007) systematically varied the spatial distance 
between the participants’ real hand and an artificial one in the RHI 
and found that the subjective perception of spatial identity of visual 
and tactile stimuli vanished gradually with higher distances. This 
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result can be described in terms of visuo-tactile response fields. The 
strength of the RHI could be described as a function of the degree of 
overlap between the response fields for the artificial and for the real 
hand. 
An essential step in the future research on response fields 
therefore consists in the question as to whether the processing of 
visual stimuli in peripersonal space can be described in terms of 
response fields. A possible approach for this venture might consist in 
the replication of study 1 and 2, applying visual instead of tactile 
stimuli, or systematically varying both. 
6.2.2 Dynamics of Body Representations 
The role of a congenital body-model As illustrated in the 
introduction of this thesis, spatial representations of the body exhibit 
a high degree of plasticity (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 
2007; Guterstam et al., 2011; Longo & Lourenco, 2007; Schaefer et 
al., 2007; Schaefer et al., 2009), but it is an debated question as to 
whether these alterations of body representations are primarily based 
on bottom-up or top-down processes. Using the paradigm of the RHI 
it has been shown that the temporal synchrony of tactile stimuli and 
visual feedback is, though a necessary, not a sufficient condition to 
induce a change in the representation of the body (Pavani et al., 
2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Supplementary to the reported 
constraints of an anatomically plausible posture of the artificial hand 
(Ehrsson et al., 2004; Pavani et al., 2000) and of its realistic 
appearance (Holmes et al., 2006; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), it was 
shown in study 4 that also the anatomically congruent coupling 
between single fingers of the artificial and the real hand is an 
important precondition for altering body representations (Figure 13). 
Contrary to anatomical congruence, the consistency of the 
coupling between real and artificial fingers had no significant effect 
on body representations (Figure 14). A consistent coupling between 
events at the real and the artificial hand does not seem to be a 
sufficient factor for inducing changes in body representations. This 
pattern was found for the passive and the active induction method, 
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and it was revealed by phenomenal self-reports and a perceptual 
measure of proprioceptive drift. It provides new evidence for the 
existence of a congenital body-model (De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009; 
Gallagher et al., 1998; Melzack et al., 1997), involving unmodifiable 
constraints concerning the general appearance of the body (Holmes 
et al., 2006), the connectedness of its parts (Pavani et al., 2000) and, 
as demonstrated in study 4, the anatomically congruent coupling 
between events at the body surface and their perceptual effects, or 
between motor commands and their bodily effects, respectively 
(Figure 13). 
This finding stands in contrast to the report of an altered 
topography of the primary somatosensory cortex after anatomically 
incongruent visual feedback regarding tactile stimuli at the little 
finger and the thumb (Schaefer et al., 2006). Interestingly, in the 
study by Schaefer et al. (2006) neuronal alterations were 
accompanied by a referred sensation between little finger and thumb, 
but not by a subjective incorporation of the artificial hand. Since this 
latter finding (the absence of subjective incorporation) was replicated 
in study 4, it implies that alterations in the topography of the primary 
somatosensory cortex can occur independently from the subjective 
embodiment of an artificial limb. In other words, one can feel a 
touch at a non-stimulated finger (according to the incongruent visual 
feedback at an artificial hand), without perceiving the same artificial 
hand as one’s own, which ultimately would imply two different 
processes being in effect during the RHI. The effect of referred 
sensation reported by Schaefer et al. (2006) can be solely explained 
by visual dominance (Hecht & Reiner, 2009), whereas the subjective 
embodiment is based on an altered body representation, therefore 
being constrained to an anatomically congruent coupling. 
 
Controlling for top-down influences Due to the growing 
evidence for the importance of the distinction between a sense of 
ownership and a sense of agency as two different aspects of the 
bodily self (Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 
2006; Tsakiris et al., 2010), many attempts have been made to 
investigate the sense of agency within the RHI paradigm. By 
implementing active motor control over an artificial hand, many 
researchers induced a feeling of agency for the latter. However, in 
most studies a video-image of the own ipsilateral hand (Kammers et 
al., 2009b; Longo & Haggard, 2009; Newport et al., 2010; Tsakiris et 
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al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2010) or a mirror reflection of the own 
contralateral hand (Holmes et al., 2004; Holmes & Spence, 2005; 
Holmes et al., 2006) were presented as ‘artificial’ hands and were 
supposed to be recognized as body-extraneous objects. This 
approach raises serious issues concerning the topic under 
investigation, namely the incorporation of body-extraneous objects, 
because the participants indeed are looking at their own hand 
(Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Due to the high familiarity regarding 
video-images and mirrors, it is reasonable to ask, if the incorporation 
of a visually displaced own hand and a prosthetic hand are based on 
the same mechanisms (Bertamini et al., 2011; Ijsselsteijn et al., 
2006), and whether the observed effects can be explained solely on 
the basis of top-down processes. 
The results of study 3 and 4 provide a negative answer to the 
latter question. The experimental set-up in both studies enabled 
active motor control over finger movements of an artificial wooden 
hand, which was unambiguously recognized as body-extraneous. 
Nevertheless, significant differences between the synchronous and 
the asynchronous feedback conditions were found in study 3, both 
with respect to the passive and the active induction methods. These 
results were replicated in study 4. 
The replication of RHI effects within an experimental set-up 
involving active control over unambiguously body-extraneous 
objects is an important step for the research on agency, because it 
rejects the possibility that the effects found with video- or mirror-
based versions of the RHI are exclusively based on top-down 
influences (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). 
6.2.3 Differential Effects of Ownership and Agency 
By separating the sense of body ownership from the sense of 
agency over bodily movements, Tsakiris et al. (2006) could show 
that implementing active finger movements within the RHI affected 
body representations in a qualitatively different manner than the 
original version involving only passive tactile stimulation. The 
sensory integration of efferent motor commands and spatially 
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displaced visual feedback about the produced movements resulted in 
a holistic change of the hand’s representation, affecting the whole 
configuration of the hand, while the sensory integration of tactile and 
visual information exclusively affected the stimulated finger 
(Tsakiris et al., 2006). 
Together with the (recently debated) hypothesis that the sense of 
ownership and agency might be based on independent neuronal 
processes (Synofzik et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010), this 
observation suggests that body representations might be differently 
affected by passive tactile sensations, inducing a sense of ownership, 
and active voluntary movements, supplementarily inducing a sense 
of agency (Tsakiris et al., 2006). However, an overall finding of 
study 3 and 4 consisted in absolutely equal effects of passive touch 
and active movements, quantified by phenomenal self-reports, 
perceptual judgements and motor responses (Figures 10 and 12-14). 
These unexpected results will be discussed with respect to the body 
image/schema distinction and the impact of a congenital body-
model. 
 
Body image vs. body schema According to the initial 
conceptualization by Head & Holmes (1911), the body image is 
defined as the sum of conscious perceptions and attitudes towards 
one’s own body, while the body schema refers to a pre-conscious 
representation of the body underlying the execution and guidance of 
movements (Gallagher, 2005). The comparison of perceptual and 
motor tasks is therefore a widely used method to disentangle 
alterations of the body image and the body schema, respectively 
(Cardinali et al., 2011; Kammers et al., 2006; Kammers et al., 2009a; 
Kammers et al., 2009b). According to the results of study 3, both the 
passive and the active induction method affected the body image as 
well as the body schema, which contradicts the results of Kammers 
et al. (2009; 2009), who did not find any effects on motor responses 
for neither of the induction methods. On the other hand, behavioral 
effects of the RHI in motor tasks have been reported in other studies 
(Heed et al., 2011; Holmes et al., 2006; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; 
Kammers et al., 2010). 
These inconsistencies with respect to motor responses might be 
explained by the fact that body-schematic alterations are extremely 
short-lived (Rossetti, 1998) and might therefore be less stable than 
alterations of the body image (Gallagher, 2005; Head & Holmes, 
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1911; Paillard, 1999). In study 3, individual RHI effects were 
correlated between both induction methods for all measures except 
the motor task (Table 7). The exclusive absence of this correlation 
for motor responses affirms the interpretation that effects on the 
body schema, as quantified by the performance in a motor task, are 
less stable than effects on the body image. 
Cardinali et al. (2011) recently argued that the implementation of 
motor tasks is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to detect 
alterations of the body schema. They asked their participants to point 
towards specific locations on their right forearm, thereby indirectly 
indicating its perceived length. These pointing movements were 
biased only when the target (elbow, wrist or fingertip) was specified 
by a tactile stimulus, as opposed to when it was specified by naming 
the body part (Cardinali et al., 2011). Since the effects in the motor 
task in study 3 were found after a verbal specification of the target 
(i.e., the right index finger), it is plausible to ask whether they would 
have been more pronounced after tactile target specification. The 
results of Cardinali et al. (2011) raise doubts on the appropriateness 
of the method for target specification used in study 3, and indicate an 
important modification to be investigated in future research. 
 
Congenital body-model The results of study 4 revealed a strong 
influence of a congenital body-model, imposing anatomical 
constraints on alterations of body representations. Again, these 
influences were absolutely equal for the passive and the active 
induction method. Both with respect to passive touch and active 
movements, not only the temporal synchrony, but also the 
anatomical congruence between touches/movements at the real and 
the artificial hand was of essential importance for the induction of 
the RHI. 
The comparability of effects resulting from the passive and the 
active induction method suggests a common neural basis underlying 
the experience of ownership and agency, as it is mandatory in an 
additive model of body ownership and agency (Tsakiris et al., 2010). 
Such an additive model proposes an asymmetrical relationship 
between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency. According 
to this view, agency necessarily includes ownership, but not vice 
versa (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2010). The alternative 
model, labeled as independence model, states that ownership and 
agency are qualitatively different experiences based on (at least 
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partially) different neural networks (Synofzik et al., 2008; Tsakiris et 
al., 2010). 
It should be mentioned here that the results of Tsakiris et al. 
(2006) can be interpreted in accordance with a higher impact of a 
congenital body-model for an active version of the RHI. In their 
study it was reported that ownership over a specific part of an 
artificial hand (e.g., the index finger) can be induced independently 
from the perceived ownership over the residual artificial hand (e.g., 
the little finger). A shift of the perceived location of the stimulated 
finger, but not for other fingers of the same hand clearly constitutes a 
violation of anatomical constraints for body posture, because the 
finger is felt at a different spatial location than the associated hand. 
These violations of anatomical constraints were only found for the 
induction method based on passive touch, while the induction 
method involving active movements resulted in a holistic shift of the 
whole hand, i.e., according to the assumptions of a congenital body-
model. The results of Tsakiris et al. (2006) therefore might be 
interpreted in terms of a higher impact of a congenital body-model 
for the active induction method, which contradicts the results found 
in study 4 of this thesis. 
6.2.4 Methodological Aims 
Methodological aims of the present thesis comprised the 
implementation of an RHI version involving active motor control 
over unambiguously body-extraneous objects, as well as the 
development of a new procedure for the assessment of 
proprioceptive drift. Both the experimental set-up and the method of 
assessing proprioceptive drift were successfully implemented and 
validated. 
 
Experimental set-up An essential shortcoming of most studies 
investigating the sense of agency within the RHI consists in the use 
of video images of the own ipsilateral hand or mirror reflections of 
the own contralateral hand as ‘artificial’ hands (Holmes et al., 2004; 
Holmes & Spence, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006; Kammers et al., 
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2009b; Longo & Haggard, 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 
2010). This approach raises serious concerns as to whether the RHI 
effects can be accounted for solely on the basis of top-down 
processes (discussed in section 6.2.2). 
These concerns were eliminated in study 3, where participants 
were confronted with a prosthetic wooden hand containing movable 
joints at the digits, which unambiguously was recognized as body-
extraneous. Movable wooden hands were also used in a recent study 
by Kalckert & Ehrsson (2012), but an important advantage of the 
method implemented here is that the movements of the artificial 
fingers were electronically controlled via capacitive sensors beneath 
the participants’ own fingers (see method sections 4.2 and 5.2 for 
details), while in the study by Kalckert & Ehrsson (2012), artificial 
fingers were physically connected with the participants’ own fingers. 
This set-up, however, involves force feedback from the artificial 
fingers to the own fingers, and therefore includes the risk of 
mingling the effects of incorporation of artificial hands and tool-use 
(De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009). The phenomenal experience of 
mechanically transmitted feedback from a tool is located at the tip of 
that tool rather than at the hand holding it, but this does not coincide 
with a feeling of ‘being’ the tool (James, 1890/1950; Yamamoto & 
Kitazawa, 2001). 
The induction method developed in the present thesis does not 
involve a physical connection between the own and the artificial 
hand, and allows for more naturalistic movements of the own hand 
without force feedback. It therefore provides a valuable instrument to 
investigating the sense of agency over unambiguously body-
extraneous objects. Furthermore, it constitutes an improvement over 
other induction methods, because it is applicable to specific research 
questions, which are difficult to be approached with video-based or 
mirror-based versions of the RHI, e.g., the issue of anatomically 
incongruent motor control, as it was investigated in study 4. 
 
Assessment of proprioceptive drift A new procedure for the 
assessment of proprioceptive drift (i.e., a drift of the perceived 
position of the own hand) was developed, based on the calculation of 
psychometric functions regarding the perceived hand location. A 
thorough description of this procedure is given in the method 
sections of study 3 and 4 (sections 4.2 and 5.2). Apart from being 
validated as a reliable tool to measure the proprioceptive drift of the 
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own towards the artificial hand, an effect that has been consistently 
found in the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Kammers et al., 2009a; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), the developed procedure exhibits some 
essential advantages compared to alternative methods. 
Most importantly, it allows for the statistical estimation of 
discrimination performance, which can be quantified by the slopes of 
the psychometric functions (Figure 11). Altered discrimination 
performance reflects an essential aspect with the RHI, because it 
indicates an increased uncertainty regarding the veridical position of 
the own hand. In the psychometric study by Longo et al. (2008), a 
perceived ‘loss of own hand’ was revealed as a main component of 
the subjective experience during the RHI, and the assessment of 
discrimination performance might serve as a more objective measure 
of this subjective experience. 
An alternative method for the assessment of proprioceptive drift 
consists in placing a ruler above the unseen hand and asking the 
participant to name the number, which is located directly above the 
own index finger (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2006). This method requires 
different random sequences of numbers on the ruler as well as 
variations in the ruler’s offset for every new application, in order to 
eliminate the risk of thoughtless repetitions. This inevitably causes 
differences between single trials, enhancing the likelihood of 
artefacts. In another method an object is moved visibly along a 
horizontal line in front of the participant, who is instructed to 
indicate when the perceived position of the own index finger is 
reached (e.g., Kammers et al., 2009a). Estimates for this method are 
biased towards the starting point of the movement (Riemer, Trojan, 
Kleinböhl, & Hölzl, 2012), so that the method requires at least two 
applications for each experimental condition (including left-to-right 
and right-to-left movements). 
Due to the annihilation of the disadvantages inherent in other 
methods and the availability of a parameter for discrimination 
performance, the developed procedure constitutes a viable tool for 
the assessment of proprioceptive drift and discrimination 
performance within the RHI. 
One disadvantage of the developed procedure consists in the time 
required for its execution, which encompassed approximately 2min. 
This raises the question about the temporal persistence of the RHI 
and the time course of the illusions strength, though the results from 
study 3 and 4 suggest the stability of the illusion at least over a 
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temporal period of the 2min. Nevertheless, this issue can be resolved 
in future applications of the procedure by the implementation of 
adaptive presentation strategies. 
6.3 Conclusion 
It has long been acknowledged that the mental representation of 
peripersonal space is fundamentally connected to the mental 
representation of the own body. In philosophy, this basic link has 
been recognized for logical reasons: a prerequisite for the perception 
of space is a first-person perspective, which (phenomenally) lies 
within the bodily borders (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). The body 
itself constitutes a spatial extension of the phenomenal self (Sartre, 
1943/1958). 
As discussed in section 6.2.1, psychological sciences have 
brought forward empirical evidence for the interdependency of body 
and space representations. In the first part of this thesis (study 1 and 
2), it was shown that postural representations of the body affect the 
representation of peripersonal space. Furthermore, response fields 
were proposed as a conceptual framework to describe changes in 
peripersonal space depending on body posture. The concept of 
response fields was developed and tested in the first part of the 
thesis. 
The second part of the thesis (study 3 and 4) revealed some 
limitations regarding the plasticity of body representations, which 
can be induced by manipulating the perceived location of touches or 
bodily movements in peripersonal space. Besides the reinforcement 
of results from prior studies by eliminating the possibility that those 
were merely based on top-down processes (study 3), the impact of 
anatomical constraints for body representations was shown. 
Overall, the results of the thesis are in line with the general 
notion of the interdependency between mental representations of 
peripersonal space and mental representations of the own body. 
However, although it is impossible to investigate the representation 
of space under conditions of an absent body, as it is symbolized in 
the initial excerpt on the discarnate spiritual being (Brod, 1916), the 
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application of tactile body illusions provides a viable tool for the 
research on the dynamics of body and space representations. 
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